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NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION: THE NEWEST 
APPROACH TO HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING 
Bernd Holznagel* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States there is increasing interest in the use of 
arbitration and mediation as an alternative to the adjudication of 
disputes. 1 Time consuming and costly court procedures are incen-
tives to search for consensual dispute resolution methods. In public 
sector disputes, adjudicatory administrative procedures often lead 
to costly delays or, in the case of the siting of hazardous waste 
facilities, often fail to resolve disputes. 2 
Traditionally, mediation has been used to resolve collective bar-
gaining disputes. 3 Divorce mediation4 and neighborhood mediation5 
have also been used on an increasingly regular basis. The list of 
instances in which mediation has proved successful in public resource 
allocation disputes is growing steadily.6 Consensual approaches to 
resolving environmental disputes have now been used for a decade. 7 
At first, mediators were employed on a case-by-case basis to resolve 
disputes involving the siting of flood control dams, highways, public 
parks, and transportation terminals. 8 Recently, several federal agen-
cies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have 
experimented with mediation and negotiation in the administrative 
* Candidate for Ph.D. in Law, Hamburg University; Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School 
Program on Negotiation, 1985; J.D. Free University, Berlin, 1983. 
The author would like to thank Professor Larry Susskind, Executive Director of the Pro-
gram on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School, for helpful advice and criticism. 
'See infra notes 2-10 and accompanying text. 
2 See Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 317 (1980); M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, 
FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1983); Bingham & Miller, Prospects for Resolving 
Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes through Negotiation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 473 (1984). 
3 See W.E. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1971). 
4 See J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND COUN-
SELORS (1981). 
5 See B.S. ALPER & L.T. NICHOLS, BEYOND THE COURTROOM (1981). 
6 See G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES-A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 
(1984); Susskind & Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public Sector, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENTIST 256 (1983); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 177-81 (1982). 
7 BINGHAM, supra note 6. 
8 See A.R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 
(1983). See also Mitchell, The Northern Manitoba Hydro Dispute: A Case Study, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL MEDIATION INTERNATIONAL, 11-24 (1983). 
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rule-making process. 9 Statutes in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Wis-
consin, and Connecticut authorize, or even require, negotiation and 
mediation of waste facility siting disputes.1O While the techniques 
used in environmental mediation extend far beyond the methods 
employed for mediation in the private sector, however, mediation 
should be viewed as a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, 
traditional adjudicatory procedures. 
This article discusses the role of mediation and negotiation of 
hazardous waste facility siting procedures. The first section of the 
article introduces the political and legal framework governing haz-
ardous waste facility siting decisions. This section concludes that the 
major obstacle to the siting of hazardous waste facilities is public 
opposition, and that such siting decisions are particularly influenced 
by public opposition because they are made at the state and not the 
feJeral level of government. The second section of the article dis-
cusses state facility siting techniques that provide no role for nego-
tiation or arbitration. These "non-negotiative" techniques typically 
include the state preemption of local authority. The third section of 
the article discusses state siting techniques that do provide a role 
for negotiation or arbitration, specifically the Massachusetts Haz-
ardous Waste Facility Siting Act. The fourth and final section com-
pares the Massachusetts statute with those enacted in Rhode Island, 
Wisconsin and Connecticut, and describes the theoretical advantages 
and disadvantages of each. 
1. THE DILEMMA OF HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING 
The United States, like all industrial nations, produces huge 
amounts of waste every year. In 1978, 130 million metric tons of 
municipal waste,l1 5 million metric tons (dry weight) of sewage 
sludge, 430 million metric tons (dry weight) of agricultural wastes, 
over 3 billion tons of mining wastes, and approximately 344 million 
metric tons of industrial wastes were generated in the United 
States. 12 
9 Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure/or Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Kirtz, EPA 
Announces Negotiated Rulemaking Project, 3 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 367 (1982). 
10 Bingham & Miller, supra note 2, at 473-78. 
11 Unless indicated otherwise, the figures given are wet weight. 
12 EPA ANNUAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION ACT OF 1976, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 1-2 (1979) [herein-
after cited as 1978 EPA ANNUAL REP.). For the 1977 data, see M.K. GREENBERG & R.F. 
ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY GAP 6 (1984). In 1976, the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the House Committee on Science and 
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Not all types of waste, however, pose the same problems for public 
health and the environment. In the case of hazardous waste, special 
treatment and disposal is necessary because of its potential harm to 
the environment, and to public health and safety. The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),13 which is the 
federal regulatory program for solid and hazardous wastes, defines 
the term hazardous waste as a solid waste that may pose a significant 
threat to human health or the environment when improperly man-
aged. 14 In general, hazardous waste enters the environment through 
one or more of six major pathways,15 the most prevalent and men-
acing of which is contamination of groundwater by leachate. 16 Fur-
thermore, groundwater contamination is difficult to detect and can 
remain for decades. 17 
Available estimates concerning the quantity of hazardous waste 
produced annually vary widely. In 1980 the EPA released a study 
estimating that the volume of hazardous waste generated annually 
was between 27.4 and 53.9 million metric tons. IS In later studies, 
the EPA estimates that approximately 760,000 generators produce 
between 50 to 60 million metric tons of hazardous waste annually. 19 
Technology estimated that approximately 3-4 billion tons of discarded materials are generated 
every year. See H.R. Rep. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 623 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]. 
13 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982). 
14 [d. § 6903(5). The term solid waste means "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste 
treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other 
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting 
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activ-
ities .... " [d. § 6903 (27); 40 C.F.R. § 216.2 (1983). 
15 This result was found by the EPA after analyzing over 311 case studies of hazardous 
waste pollution incidents. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TRANSPORTATION AND COMMERCE, MA-
TERIALS RELATING TO THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976; see also 
Duffy, State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Easing the Process through Local Cooperation 
and Preemption, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 755, 761 (1984). 
16 F.A. HART, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL HAZARDOUS 
WASTE PROBLEMS 27 (1979); Canter, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the New State Siting 
Programs, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 421, 424 (1982). Leachate is any liquid that percolates 
through drained from hazardous waste. See MASS. DEPT. OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS--STATEWIDE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
REPORT F-4 (1981). 
17 See Wolf, Publ';c Opposition to Hazardous Waste Sites: The Self-Defeating Approach to 
National Hazardous Waste Control Under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 463, 468 (1980). 
18 Booz-ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., AND PUTNAM, HAYES & BARTETT, INC., HAZARDOUS 
WASTE GENERATION AND COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS MANAGEMENT CAPACITy-AN ASSESS-
MENT A-9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Booz-ALLEN]. For a general discussion about the 
different estimates, see GREENBERG & ANDER~ON, supra note 12, at 1-29. 
19 EPA ANNUAL REP., supra note 12, at 1. An EPA consultant reported that 14,100 
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The annual rate of increase in the amount of hazardous waste pro-
duced is estimated by the EPA to be between three and four per-
cent.20 The chemical and allied products industries is the largest 
generator of hazardous waste; it generates sixty-two percent of the 
annual total. Other major sources include the primary metal industry 
contributing ten percent, and the fabricated metal products industry 
contributing five percent.21 Approximately fifteen percent of these 
wastes have been disposed off-site and seventy-five percent on-site. 22 
The greatest amount of hazardous wastes is produced in states 
with large industrial sectors: New Jersey (3.l%), Texas (3.0%), Cal-
ifornia (2.6%), Ohio (2.6%), Pennsylvania (2.6%), Illinois (2.5%), New 
York (2.3%), Michigan (2.0%), Tennessee (1.3%), and North Carolina 
(1.3%).23 
Before the enactment of RCRA in 1976, most state solid waste 
statutes addressed exclusively the planning and management of solid 
waste disposal and sanitary landfills, and omitted provisions for 
hazardous waste control. 24 Before 1976, only California, Illinois, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington had en-
acted comprehensive hazardous waste management legislation. 25 At 
the time RCRA was enacted, half of all states assigned no more than 
one or two persons to work on hazardous waste issues. 26 This inad-
equate or nonexistent regulatory control of hazardous waste was one 
generators are estimated to have produced 150 million metric tons of waste in 1980. EPA, 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND TREATMENT, STORAGE AND 
DISPOSAL FACILITIES REGULATED UNDER RCRA IN 1981: PRELIMINARY HIGHLIGHTS OF 
FINDINGS (1983). See also GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 173. One expert even 
estimates the national volume to be 250 million metric tons. WESTAT, INC. NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS AND TREATMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES 
UNDER RCRA IN 1983 (1984). 
20 EPA, SOLID WASTE FACTS: A STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
EPA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK]. The annual rate of increase for all waste is estimated at 8%. 
Legislative History, supra note 12, at 6239. 
21 Booz-ALLEN, supra note 18, at 4. 
22 On-site means on the same property where the waste was generated. [d. See also 
GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 8. 
23 See GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 14. 
24 The development of solid waste management began in the 1960s. Before this period, the 
states regulated refuse disposal only. The regulation of hazardous waste that did exist was 
thus largely a matter of broad, and sometimes incorrect, interpretation of state solid waste 
statutes. Wolf, supra note 17, at 471 n.36. 
25 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 6261. 
26 [d. at 6242. It is noted that: 
EPA has been able to identify approximately 50 people in 25 states as working 
primarily or exclusively on hazardous waste management. Some of these have been 
employed to work on specific tasks (usually state hazardous waste surveys) and do 
not make active contributions to other aspects of the state's program. Approximately 
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reason for the "near universal mismanagement" of hazardous waste 
disposal. 27 The EPA estimates that before 1976 almost half of all 
hazardous wastes were placed in unlined surface impoundments or 
lagoons.28 Another thirty percent were buried along with a host of 
nonhazardous wastes in ordinary landfills or stored above ground in 
barrels.29 Ten percent was disposed of by uncontrolled incineration, 
without adequate measures taken to prevent the release of hazard-
ous emission into the air.30 The balance of hazardous waste was 
disposed of by a variety of illicit methods such as midnight dumping 
along rural roadsides, or illegal dumping into municipal sewers and 
creeks. 31 Congressional drafters of RCRA described the situation as 
follows: 
[c]urrent estimates indicate that approximately 30-35 million 
tons of hazardous waste are literally dumped on the ground each 
year . . . . In many instances these hazardous wastes are dis-
posed of in the same manner and location as municipal refuse -
in the local landfill. There are seldom records of the deposit or 
of the composition of such hazardous wastes. It is generated, 
transported and buried without notice until the evidence of its 
presence is seen in persons or the environment.32 
The available data about improper disposal of hazardous wastes vary 
immensely.33 Widely quoted estimates by the EPA and its consul-
tants, published in 1978,34 state that between 32,000 and 50,000 
active or inactive disposal sites contain hazardous waste, and that 
up to 2000 of these sites pose a significant risk of imminent hazard 
to the public. 35 Furthermore, the EPA estimated in 1978 that ninety 
percent of the hazardous wastes generated before the enactment of 
RCRA have been treated or disposed in an environmentally unsuit-
Id. 
one-third of the total are employed in the California program alone. Most other states 
have one or two persons, three is an unusually large staff. 
27 Wolf, supra note 17, at 471. See also Duffy, supra note 15, at 762. 
28 EPA, EVERYBODY'S PROBLEM: HAZARDOUS WASTE 1-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HAZ-
ARDOUS W ASTEj. 
29 Id. 
ao Id. 
3! Id. at 14, 27. 
32 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 6249; see also Wolf, supra note 18, at 470 nn.28-
30. 
33 For a general discussion about the different estimates, see GREENBERG & ANDERSON, 
supra note 12, at 106-29. 
34 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 18, at 469-70; Canter, supra note 16, at 423. 
35 In 1978, EPA estimated that approximately 32,000 sites may contain hazardous wastes, 
and 838 may contain significant quantities of hazardous wastes. See GREENBERG & ANDERSON, 
supra note 12, at 107. 
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able manner that jeopardizes human health and natural systems. 36 
Estimates published in 1983, however, show that approximately 
16,000 inactive sites are thought to contain hazardous wastes, of 
which 546 are on EPA's list of so-called "priority sites".37 
Clearly, these improperly managed hazardous waste sites are 
"ticking time bomb[s] primed to go off,"38 and threaten to cause 
tremendous harm to public health, the environment and even to the 
political system itself. Several hazardous waste catastrophes have 
already occurred,39 the best known example of which is synonymous 
with improper hazardous waste disposal in the United States: the 
1978 Love Canal case. 40 
Congress reacted to this state of mismanagement by enacting the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),41 and the 
Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA).42 RCRA was the first federal regulatory program aimed 
at control of solid and hazardous wastes. CERCLA contains require-
ments for the investigation of hazardous waste disposal sites and 
practices, and outlines a national plan for remedying actual or threat-
ened releases of hazardous wastes. 
After the enactment of RCRA and CERCLA, there was an in-
creasing demand for the construction of state-of-the-art hazardous 
waste facilities. 43 The most important change concerning the siting 
of new facilities is the shift away from the use of on-site to the use 
36 EPA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 4; Canter, supra note 16, at 423. 
37 See GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 108, 123. 
38 Legislative History, supra note 12, at 6254-61. It is surprising that research on the health 
effects of human exposure to hazardous waste is not sophisticated. See GREENBERG & AN-
DERSON, supra note 12, at 84-105. 
39 A chemical company used the Love Canal landfill site as a waste dump from 1942 to 1953. 
After the property was sold, a school and houses were built on the site and in the surrounding 
area. In 1976, large amounts of hazardous waste began to leak from the site. Fumes and 
leachate began seeping into the basements of homes and rising to the surface of yards and 
children's play areas. In August 1978, President Carter declared a state of emergency in the 
area. Approximately 1,000 families were evacuated; cleanup and relocation costs have thus 
far exceeded $30 million. The N. Y. State Health Dept. asserts that contamination at the site 
has caused an increased incidence of spontaneous abortions, birth defects, and serious illness 
in the area. The cancer rate in the vicinity is 30 times the national average. See M. BROWN, 
LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS 1-54 (1979). 
40 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-74 (1982). 
4142 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). The Act is popularly called Superfund because it creates a fund 
to finance clean-up and other government actions to eliminate imminently dangerous condi-
tions. 
42 For a general discussion, see GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 169-75; Booz-
ALLEN, supra note 18, at II, III. 
43Id. at X-1-X-6; Wolf, supra note 17, at 768. 
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of off-site facilities. 44 Several factors are responsible for this devel-
opment. First, RCRA's broader definition of hazardous waste, and 
the additional accumulation of hazardous waste resulting from re-
moval efforts initiated under the CERCLA, increases the sheer 
amount of hazardous waste which must be treated and disposed. 
Second, since the implementation of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments45 and the Clean Water Act,46 industries' use of pollution 
control devices extracts greater amounts of hazardous waste from 
their manufacturing processes. 47 Third, RCRA reduced the cost ad-
vantages for on-site disposal. Before RCRA, on-site facilities were 
almost entirely exempt from state and local permit requirements. 
When the number of regulatory requirements increased, it became 
cheaper for generators to share the costs of off-site disposal rather 
to build their own hazardous waste facilities. 48 
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management 
(DEM) estimates that in Massachusetts, 190,000 to 240,000 tons per 
year of hazardous wastes require off-site treatment and disposal. 49 
Massachusetts hazardous waste generators ship more than sixty 
percent of all hazardous waste to Connecticut (which receives 33%), 
New York (which receives 5.6%), New Jersey (which receives 5.6%), 
Alabama (which receives 3.6%), and Rhode Island (which receives 
3.5%).50 High transportation costs combined with the possibility of 
major lawsuits associated with the increased risk of accidents en 
route to out-of-state facilities are the necessary consequences of such 
a situation. Furthermore, states are increasingly resistant to receiv-
ing hazardous waste imports. This attitude will be reinforced as 
state-owned facilities, especially landfill sites, fill to capacity. New 
44 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982». 
45 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1300 (1982). 
46 Canter, supra note 16, at 426. 
47 Booz-ALLEN, supra note 18, at VIII-1-X-9. In 1980, 9.7 million metric tons were treated 
or disposed of in 127 sites. These 127 facilities were operated by 89 private firms and 4 public 
agencies. The hazardous waste industry is highly concentrated: the largest 4 national firms 
account for approximately 45% of industry revenues. The 1981 capacity for hazardous waste 
management is estimated to be over 18.4 million metric tons. However, there is a significant 
mismatch between supply and demand. For example, EPA Region VI has almost 44% of the 
national off-site capacity, whereas EPA Region VIII has no capacity at all. The study estimates 
that there is a total shortfall of 1.4 million metric tons in 5 of 10 EPA regions. 
4" MASS. DEPT. OF ENVTL. MANAGEMENT, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN MASS.-
STATEWIDE ENVTL. IMPACT REPORT 3-3, 3-5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as MASS. DEPT. OF 
ENVTL. MANAGEMENT]. 
49Id. at 3-11. 
50 Interview with Joan Gardner, Executive Officer, Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility 
Site Safety Council (July 15, 1985). 
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hazardous waste disposal facilities are, therefore, increasingly nec-
essary in Massachusetts. 51 
In spite of the high demand for hazardous waste facilities, a 1984 
report by the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety 
Council (HWFSSC) shows that, pursuant to new state hazardous 
waste siting statutes, only eight facilities have been approved for 
operation in the United States. As of 1984, there have been thirty-
two siting attempts: eighteen failed, three were still in court, three 
were in the process of approval, and only eight were approved. 52 
Remarkably, it is not now known exactly how many of the approved 
facilities are actually in operation. 53 Explaining the failure or delay 
of siting attempts is not always easy; the one factor common to most 
of them is extensive public opposition. 54 It has been argued that 
public opposition is the greatest, or the only, obstacle in implement-
ing the entire hazardous waste management program under 
RCRA.55 
What is described as public opposition to siting attempts in the 
United States is not the same as the public opposition by environ-
mentalists trying to halt siting attempts in Europe. In Europe, both 
the governmental decision-making and the environmental movement 
itself are more centralized than in the United States. Public oppo-
sition in the United States is found mainly among local residents, 
their elected officials, and state politicians who have a local political 
constituency. 56 In Europe, specifically in West Germany, resistance 
51 A.S. RYAN, ApPROACHES TO HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (1984). 
52 Interview with Joan Gardner, Executive Director, Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Fa-
cility Site Safety Council (July 11, 1985). 
53 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, EPA SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES AND 
PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1982) [hereinafter cited as EPA SITING]. See also NAT'L GOVERNOR'S 
ASS'N, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES 2 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L GOVER-
NOR'S ASS'N]. 
54 See EPA SITING, supra note 53, at III. See also Wolf, supra note 17, at 482 n.76. Wolf 
points out that public opposition cannot be singled out as a major obstacle to the implemen-
tation of the RCRA program: 
[t]he real impediment to effective hazardous waste control is the absence in national 
hazardous waste policy of a strategy that places paramount emphasis on the reduction 
of hazardous waste at its source which is coupled with the stringent disposal regu-
lation promised by Subtitle C. There is additional justification for citizen opposition 
due to the past, present and future underfunding of regulatory programs which make 
them inadequate to protect public health and the environment from serious hazardous 
waste pollution. 
[d. at 540. 
55 See EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 35--315. See also D. MORELL & C. MAGORIAN, SITING 
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES 21-46 (1982). 
56 See Popper, Siting LULU's, PLANNING, April 1981, at 12 (1981). 
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to siting decisions is organized by nationwide environmental groups, 
or even national political parties like the Greens. It is difficult thus 
to address public opposition in the United States by national legis-
lation. State legislation is therefore a more appropriate vehicle for 
dealing with this problem. 
Ever since the phenomenon of local opposition was observed dur-
ing attempts to site power plants, airports, or prisons, acronyms 
such as L UL U's (locally unwanted land uses)57 and NIMBY (not in 
my backyard)58 were coined to describe the situation. Indeed, inves-
tigations have shown that a majority of people recognize the need 
for new hazardous waste facilities; on the other hand, they do not 
want one located within one hundred miles of their homes. 59 A recent 
study on citizen attitudes towards these facilities in five Massachu-
setts communities shows that the percentage of residents who would 
oppose the siting of a facility increases approximately twenty percent 
if the facility is to be built in the local community rather than 
elsewhere in the state. 60 
Opponents of hazardous waste facilities adopt a wide range of 
tactics to delay or to stop siting attempts; their common tactics 
include vocal participation during public hearings and the initiation 
of law suits. 61 Although the use of these methods may not stop the 
project, costs of its implementation may be increased. Sometimes 
the costs of delay are sufficient to defeat the whole proposal. 62 An-
other method of influencing the implementation of a developer's plan 
is to persuade landowners to refuse to sell land in the potential site 
area. 63 In addition, local residents often organize public meetings, 
media events or referenda to express their unified resistance. In 
some cases citizens have used illegal means, including violence, to 
block the building of facilities. 64 
57 See, e.g., O'Hare, Not on My Block, You Don't-Facility Siting and the Importance of 
Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'y 407 (1977). 
58 See NAT'L GOVERNOR'S ASS'N, supra note 53, at 2. 
59 K.E. PORTNEY, CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: 
PUBLIC OPINION IN FIVE MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES 14-15 (1983). 
60 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 14, 157. See also Bacow & Milkey, Overcoming Local 
Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 265 (1982). 
61 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 14. 
62 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 795 n.281. 
63 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at III-IV. 
64 For a general discussion, see Provost, The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility 
Siting Act: What Impact on Municipal Power to Exclude and Regulate?, 10 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 739 (1983). 
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Municipal officials may exercise the local police power to influence 
siting attempts. The scope of this power varies from state to state 
and is determined by the home rule provisions of the state law. 65 
The United States Constitution provides no explicit right of self-
government for municipalities. Municipal powers are defined in state 
constitutions. The tenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that the "powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved 
to the states respectively, or to the people."66 In an interpretation 
of the tenth amendment, the Court in City of Trenton v. State of 
New Jersey, 67 held that, in the absence of state constitutional pro-
visions establishing independent rights, municipalities are mere de-
partments of the states, and that therefore states may grant or 
withdraw privileges and powers as they see fit. To protect some 
municipal rights, many states have enacted home rule amendments 
to the state constitution. Massachusetts, for example, adopted a 
home rule amendment in 1966: 
[a]ny city or town may, by the adoption ... of local ordinances 
or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general 
court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with 
the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in conform-
ity with powers reserved to it ... and which is not denied ... 
to the city or town by its charter. "68 
Home rule in Massachusetts therefore includes land use power as 
well as the power to control public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare of the municipality. 69 
In order to block the siting of hazardous waste facilities, munici-
palities often zone their land so that such facilities are prohibited 
from locating within their boundaries. 70 Often ordinances prohibit or 
restrict the construction and operation of hazardous waste facilities 
by imposing new public health or safety permit requirements, or by 
65 u.s. CONST. amend. x. 
66 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923). 
67 See Provost, supra note 64, at 739-40 ("Home rule amendments take a variety of forms 
and create differing degrees of autonomy."). 
68 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 43B, § 13 (West 1968). The General Court retains "the power 
to act in relation to the cities and towns but only by general laws which apply alike . . ., or 
to a class of not fewer than two .... " Mass. Const. Amend. Art 2, § 8 (1978). 
69 See Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 359 (1973). 
70 See Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial: Hazardous Waste and its Regulation in 
Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 254 (1983). 
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issuing restrictions on the transportation of waste to the facility. 71 
Furthermore, local governments and politicians often use their po-
litical power to influence the state government to defeat a siting 
attempt. In a case study of four recent siting attempts in the United 
States and Canada,72 it was noted that the efforts of local residents 
and elected officials alone are usually insufficient to defeat a proposal. 
The additional support of influential policy makers at the state level 
is necessary. Influence on the state level is especially important if 
the project becomes an election issue. 73 
The dominant reason for local opposition is the fear of the major 
and long-term health and welfare risks posed by the facility to res-
idents in the surrounding areas. 74 Studies show that concern about 
safety issues is the major component of public reaction. 75 It is gen-
erally recognized that such fear is primarily the result of growing 
public recognition of hazardous waste mismanagement. 76 Public con-
cern reflects the diminishing of citizen confidence in governments' 
capacity to properly handle the hazardous waste problem. 77 
Communities envision few benefits from proposed facilities. A 
hazardous waste facility's economic impact on the community is one 
indicator· of its relative advantages and disadvantages. These facili-
71 In 1982, for example, the town of Warren, Massachusetts, adopted a by-law that prohib-
ited hazardous waste facilities within its boundaries. The town attempted to exploit an ap-
parent loophole in the new Massachusetts Siting Act. See Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste 
Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mass. 107, 466 N.E. 2d 102 (1984). The community may 
restrict, for example, the road use and impose weight limits on potential facility access roads. 
See Duffy, supra note 15, at 794. 
72 M. Ristoratore, Siting Toxic Waste Disposal Facilities: Best and Worst Cases in North 
America 7 (1985) (unpublished manuscript). 
73 Interestingly, state representatives are more loyal to their local constituencies than to 
their own political party, even when that party is in power. [d. at 27. The Massachusetts 
state legislature provides an example of the political influence of opponents to hazardous waste 
facilities. In 1979, a statewide technical study on preferable locations for facilities was released 
at the same time as a bill to preempt local control in hazardous waste matters was before the 
legislature. State legislators from the three sites that were ranked as the most appropriate 
in the study introduced bills to exempt their communities from further consideration. The bill 
was passed. Interview with Larence Bacow, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts (July 5, 1985). See also Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 273-
74. See also EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 98. 
74 See EPA SITING, supra note 53, at III; PORTNEY, supra note 59, at 54; Morell, Siting 
and the Politics of Equity, 1 Hazardous Waste 557 (1984). 
75 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at III. 
76 Duberg, Frankel & Niemczewski, Siting of Hazardous Waste Management Facilities and 
Public Opposition, 1 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 85 (1980). See also MORELL & 
MAGORIAN, supra note 55, at 22; Canter, SUpT{I, note 16, at 427. 
77 See PORTNEY, supra note 59, at 22; EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 10; Bacow & Milkey, 
supra note 60, at 268. 
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ties usually create few jobs and produce little additional tax revenue. 
On the other hand, one can predict that property values will fall, 
thereby reducing the community's tax base and limiting residents' 
ability to sell their homes at previous market values. The stigma of 
being the region's dumping ground may also have a negative effect 
on the local business community.78 Residents are not only concerned 
with economic factors: the facilities are also opposed because they 
might be a nuisance. Residents expect odors, noise and increased 
traffic on local roads. 79 
The fifth and final major reason for local opposition to new facilities 
is based in equity. Residents near the potential site question the 
fairness of burdening their community with a large share of the risks 
associated with hazardous wastes while others receive the benefits 
of reduced midnight dumping, decreased transport distances for 
hazardous waste disposal, and an increased capacity to serve the 
industrial activities which produce hazardous waste. 80 Residents of 
rural areas have been especially unwilling to accept wastes gener-
ated by urban industries. 81 Interestingly, urban residents may he 
more likely to accept the risk and dangers associated with the con-
struction of a facility. 82 
When Congress enacted RCRA, it created the first federal regu-
latory program for the systematic control of hazardous wastes. 83 To 
implement RCRA, the EPA issued several sets of regulations. 84 The 
EPA considers these regulations to be the "most complex" regula-
tions ever promulgated by the EPA. 85 
The most important amendments to RCRA were passed in 1984,86 
and were designed to close gaps in the original regulatory system. 
78 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at IV, 12--3. See also Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 
268. 
79 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at IV. 
80 Id. at 13. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 268. See also MORELL & MAGORIAN, supra 
note 55, at 41. 
81 EPA SITING, supra note 53, at IV. 
82 PORTNEY, supra note 59, at 53; Ristoratore, supra note 72, at 22. One commentator 
argues that the use of areas at the periphery of industrial regions, located downstream from 
the large population centers, minimizes the potential of public opposition: "[clommunities that 
are in the process of industrialization are more likely to be interested in a waste disposal plant 
than congested and probably polluted industrial towns or communities that prefer to conserve 
their rural character." I d. 
83 For a general description of the legislative history of RCRA, see Schnapf, State Hazard-
ous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. 
L. 679, 683 (1982). See also Wolf, supra note 17, at 463 n.2. 
84 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-71 (1983); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122-124 (1983). 
85 C. Beck, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste, EPA, in 11 ENV'T REP. (BNA) (CURR. 
DEV.) 35 (May 9, 1980). 
86 See § 221, 98 Stat. 3248 (1984). See U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5576. 
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First, the exemptions for small generators, those producing 1,000 
kilogram per month or less, were abolished. 87 Second, the require-
ments for landfill and underground injection were made more strin-
gent.88 Finally, the definition of hazardous waste was broadened. 89 
RCRA and its amendments establish a "cradle to grave system" 
to regulate hazardous waste from the time of generation to the time 
of disposal. RCRA establishes a monitoring system, combined with 
management standards and sanctions for offenders. 90 In general, this 
approach to regulation of hazardous waste consists of five major 
elements: identification and listing of hazardous waste;91 a manifest 
system for tracing the life cycle of hazardous waste from its gener-
ation to its final disposal;92 minimum standards for hazardous waste 
treatment, storage and disposal;93 requirements for state implemen-
tation of hazardous waste management;94 and an enforcement pro-
gram. 95 
87 See § 221, 98 Stat. 3248 (1984). 
88 See § 201, 98 Stat. 3226 (1984). 
89 See § 221(e)(3)(A), 98 Stat. 3251 (1984). 
90 See Worobec, Analysis of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 11 ENV'T. REP. 
(BNA) (CURR. DEV.) at 633-46 (1980); J. BELFIGLIO, T. LIPPE & S. FRANKLIN, HAZARDOUS 
WASTE DISPOSAL SITES - A HANDBOOK FOR PUBLIC INPUT AND REVIEW, 17-35 (1981). 
91 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982). The starting point of the hazardous waste management system 
is the identification and listing of such wastes. The regulations promulgated pursuant to RCRA 
set forth the substances that are deemed to be solid and hazardous wastes. 40 C.F.R. § 261 
(1983). Hazardous waste can be identified by inclusion on a list of hazardous substances, 40 
C.F.R. § 261.30-.33 (1983); and by an analysis of their characteristics, 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-
.24 (1983). In practice, listing remains the most common method of identifying hazardous 
waste. When substances are not listed, or when waste is a mix of components, a test performed 
by the generator is required. 
The RCRA regulations outline four waste characteristics: 1) ignitability - ability to cause 
fire or exacerbate fire once it is started; 2) corrosivity - ability to corrode standard containers; 
3) reactivity - instability and a tendency to explode or react violently; and 4) extraction 
procedure toxicity - the presence of certain toxic materials at levels beyond those permitted 
in the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-22, 261.24 (1983). 
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-24 (1982). Hazardous waste generators must identify hazardous waste. 
42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1982). Generators must also apply for an EPA identification number, 
properly label and package the waste produced, and then submit an annual report to the EPA. 
40 C.F.R. §§ 262.12, 262.30-.31, 262.41 (1983). The generator's most important obligation is 
to participate in the manifest system. 40 C.F.R. § 262.20-.23 (1983). For a detailed description 
of the manifest system, see BELFIGLIO, LIPPE & FRANKLIN, supra note 90, at 23-25. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982). Permits issued by the EPA are required for the operation of all 
treatment, storage and disposal facilities (TSDF). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1982). 
94 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982). Following the statutory pattern established by the Clean Air 
Act and the Clean Water Act, RCRA represents a rejection of a wholly federal system, and 
instead provides for a federal-state partnership. The EPA sets national minimum standards; 
however, states are permitted to administer their own programs if the programs comply with 
the federal requirements and are approved by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1982). Voluntary 
state participation avoids tenth amendment problems that would result from a strict federal 
approach. See Schnapf, supra note 83, at 694 n.76; Comment, RCRA's State Program Pro-
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Although RCRA regulates the technical suitability of a proposed 
site, it does not regulate whether, or where, hazardous waste facil-
ities should be built. RCRA does not address these issues; thus the 
siting of facilities is left to the states. The role of the EPA is limited 
to the provision of assistance to states,96 which includes: organization 
of an information exchange; development and dissemination of hand-
books regarding public participation, the use of mediators, and the 
identification of risks; and of monitoring the progress of siting pro-
grams. 97 
The EPA's advice to state siting planners is guided by three 
principles: environmental and social effects must be analyzed prior 
to site selection; public participation at an early stage of the process 
is a prerequisite for successful site selection; and siting attempts 
should not be restricted by blanket local vetoes. 98 
There are a number of important reasons for this state-federal 
partnership policy.99 The drafters were convinced that the states 
could more easily tailor programs to local needs because states are 
more familiar with their local citizens. 10o Similarly, the public partic-
ipation and education process is more likely to succeed when states 
administer the siting programs. Finally, states possess the broad 
eminent domain authority that is desirable for effective site selec-
tion. lOl 
The states, however, have only partially accepted this congres-
sionally designated role as promoter of hazardous waste facility sit-
ing programs. In fact, a survey of the National Conference of State 
visions and the Tenth Amendment: Coercion or Cooperation, 9 Ecalogy L. Q. 579 (1981); 
FLORINI, ISSUES OF FEDERALISM IN HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL: COOPERATION OR CON-
FUSION? 6 HARV.ENVTL.L.REV. 307, 307-10 (1982). The state program operates in lieu of 
the federal hazardous waste program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (b) (1982); Schnapf, supra note 87, at 
695; BELFIGLIO, LIPPE & FRANKLIN, supra note 90, at 56. 
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 6927-28 (1982). For a complete discussion of the enforcement provisions, 
see Weiland, Enforcement Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 8 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (1980); see also Harrington, supra note 70, at 235-39; 
Friedland, The New Hazardous Waste Management System: Regulation of Waste or Wasted 
Regulation?, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 107-08 (1981). 
96 40 C.F.R. § 263.30 (1983). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1982). 
98 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982). 
99 EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: A CRITICAL PROBLEM 6-7 (1980). 
100 See H. BELLMAN, C. SAMPSON & G. CORMICK, USING MEDIATION WHEN SITING HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES (1982); R. McMAHON, C. ERNST, R. MIYARES & 
C. HAYMORE, USING COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES WHEN SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE 
MANAGEMENT FACILITIES-HANDBOOK (1982) [hereinafter cited as McMAHON]. 
101 See also EPA SITING, supra note 53, at 6-7. 
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Legislatures published in 1982 shows that twenty-seven states chose 
to enact their own hazardous waste facility siting statutes. 102 
II. NON-NEGOTIATIVE FACILITY SITING TECHNIQUES 
This section of the article explores how new state siting statutes 
address the problem of public opposition.103 In general, there are 
two possible approaches: 1) diffuse opposition by providing for local 
citizen participation; and 2) provide for state preemption of local 
authority.104 Some states have attempted to introduce negotiating 
procedures as a way to diffuse public opposition. Massachusetts is 
the classic example of such a state; it included an elaborate negoti-
ating procedure in its siting statute. The Massachusetts approach 
therefore will be examined in detail and then compared to the leg-
islative schemes in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Wisconsin. There 
are two assumptions underlying the following discussion of facility 
siting issues: 1) the site selected is the "technical best" site; and 2) 
a facility that complies with local public health and safety require-
ments is feasible. 
A. Citizen Participation 
State statutes provide for four primary vehicles of citizen partic-
ipation: representation on state facility siting boards; formation of 
local advisory committees; public hearings; and participation in the 
site designation process. In most cases, the only possibility for local 
participation at the state level is the host community's representa-
tion on the state facility siting board. 105 However, not all states with 
special siting provisions have such a siting board,106 and not all 
boards provide representation for members from the local commu-
nity.107 In some states, the function of the siting board is performed 
102 [d. 
103 Wolf, supra note 17, at 507 n.208. Some commentators, however, suggest that "the 
claims of flexibility and responsiveness made about state programs are euphemisms for fa-
voritism toward industry." [d. at 507 n.209. 
104 [d. 
10.5 National Conference of State Legislatures, Hazardous Waste Management: A Survey of 
State Legislation (1982). 
'06 NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N, SUMMARIES OF STATE SITING PROGRAMS (1982); A.S. RYAN, 
ApPROACHES TO HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING IN THE UNITED STATES (1984). 
107 It is worth noting that a total exclusion of citizen participation is impossible because 
RCRA requires a minimum level of participation through its public hearing requirements in 
the licensing process. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 124-25 (1985). For a general discussion, see Rosen-
baum, The Politics of Public Participation in Hazardous Waste Management in THE POLITICS 
OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 177-99 (J.P. Leste & A. Bowman, eds. 1983). 
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instead by the regulatory agencies that implement the RCRA haz-
ardous waste management program. 
The authority of state siting boards varies considerably, their 
primary function, however, is to review siting proposals and to issue 
permits where appropriate. Some boards are also involved in site 
planning. In order to fulfill these functions, the board is usually 
composed of administrators of state agencies and appointees selected 
on a statewide basis. Appointees are often selected to represent a 
variety of professions and interest groups. Experts in such scientific 
disciplines as chemical engineering, hydrology or biology are com-
monly required. Local representation is always limited to partici-
pation by advocates of a specific proposal and the local representa-
tives never have the majority of votes. The siting boards range in 
size from a five member board to a twenty-one member board. 108 
Siting boards thus serve the dual purpose of providing technical and 
administrative experts to improve and legitimize site evaluation and 
selection, and of providing host communities with the opportunity 
to influence and improve site selection. 
While most of the states limit local representation in the siting 
procedure to temporary positions on the state siting boards, some 
states provide for local representative bodies, called "local project 
review committees" or "local assessment committees. "109 Minnesota's 
local project review committee is a typical example. Its members 
are appointed by the Governor to represent each location selected 
as a candidate site. The Governor is required to ensure balanced 
representation of all parties with a legitimate and direct interest in 
the siting decision. no Abutting communities, however, have no right 
to participate in this process. 
Pursuant to the Minnesota statute, a committee is charged with 
several responsibilities: to provide information about the proposed 
108 For a general description of the siting board, see Davidson, An Analysis of Existing 
Requirements For Siting and Permitting Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities and a Proposal 
for a More Workable System, 34 AD. L. REV. 533, 555 (1982); Duffy, s'upra note 15, at 775; 
Canter, supra note 16, at 448. 
109 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-119 (West Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-3 
(Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1305-
A(2) (Supp. 1985); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-703 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
21D, § 4 (West 1981); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 299.517 (West 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 115A.05 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52-54 (West 1985); N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney Baldwin 1984); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 
(Baldwin 1985). 
110 RAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3432 (1985); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-703 (1983); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-52 (West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Baldwin 1985). 
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facility; to solicit, record and communicate local attitudes and con-
cerns to government agencies; and to act as an intermediary between 
interested parties. III Technical assistance grants are provided to 
make the committee's work possible. Although in Minnesota the local 
project review committee has no formal mandate to negotiate with 
the developer, it often functions in that role since it is the mechanism 
for communication among the community, the state, and the devel-
oper. 
It is generally recognized that a state's failure to disclose relevant 
facts to citizens of the proposed host community, and exclusion of 
the community from the decision making process, increases public 
distrust and opposition. For this reason, RCRA, and the EPA's 
regulations, provide for a minimum of public participation by re-
quiring a public hearing. In general, state statutes limit public par-
ticipation to this statutorily required hearing, but notice and hearing 
requirements differ from state to state. 
The issue of proper notice is a significant aspect of the adminis-
trative hearing process. 112 In some states the government agencies 
must send notices to the landowners who live within a specific radius 
of a proposed facility;113 other states require that the chief local 
elected official be informed about the project, who then must inform 
local residents. 114 Another method of informing those most likely to 
be affected is to publish a notice in a newspaper with major circu-
lation. 115 Usually, at least one hearing is held in the host community 
after the notification, but before the issuance of a license. 116 In 
111 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65~'!432 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Baldwin 1985); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 21D, § 4 (West 1981). 
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127 (West Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, 
§ 5 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115 A.22 (West Supp. 1986). 
113 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.22 (3) (West Supp. 1986). The local committee selects a 
temporary member for the Waste Management Board. 
114 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115 A.22 (5) (West Supp. 1986). 
115 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-119 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723 (West 
Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-6 (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3434-
34 (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.855 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1305-A(2) 
(Supp. 1984); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-706 (1983); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 299.519 
(West 1984); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 466.125 (1985). 
116 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-119 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-66(n) 
(Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111.5, § 1039.l(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-3434(e) (Supp 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.855 (1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
38, § 1305-A(2) (Supp. 1985); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-706 (1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.30(20) (Callaghan Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (West 1985); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 81-1521.02 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney Supp. 
1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Baldwin 1984). 
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Georgia, however, a governmental subdivision, an association of at 
least twenty-five members, or twenty-five citizens of the proposed 
host community must make a request before a public hearing will 
be scheduled. 117 
The second important distinction among state statutes lies in the 
type of hearing required and the procedural rules to be applied. 
There are two main types of hearings: adjudicatory and legislative. 118 
The adjudicatory, or "trial-type" hearings, employ strict adversarial 
rules of procedure. During the hearing, the parties may call and 
examine witnesses and submit other evidence respecting the dis-
puted issue. Cross-examination is permitted and the state rules of 
evidence apply. The informal or "legislative-type" hearings are held 
for the purpose of receiving written or oral comments concerning 
location and operational requirements of a hazardous waste disposal 
facility. These hearings are typically held without strict procedural 
rules and interested persons are granted the opportunity to express 
their views. 
Both types of public hearings are criticized because they are often 
perceived to be more of a ritual than an effective means of citizen 
involvement. Moreover, they are often held too late in the decision-
making process to make any real difference. Scholars who favor 
consensual decision-making point out that the exclusive use of ad-
versarial hearings as mechanisms of public participation in licensing 
procedures creates a litigious process that does not encourage the 
parties to cooperate. 119 Formal, trial-type procedures govern com-
munication among the parties to adversarial hearings, and often local 
citizens are not given the opportunity to address general concerns 
or to engage in constructive communication with the developer. This 
adversarial environment creates hostility and leads almost automat-
ically to the rejection of each party's proposals. Furthermore, the 
parties are represented by lawyers who are trained in adversarial 
procedures and who often use these hearings as a method of building 
a record for court, rather than as a tool for citizen participation and 
dispute resolution. 
117 GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-66(n) (Supp. 1985). 
118 See Harrington, supra note 70, at 223; M. O'Hare, L. Bacow & D. Sanderson, supra 
note 2, at 41-43 (1983). 
119 See Popper, An Administrative Law Perspective on Consensual Decisionmaking, 35 AD. 
L. REV. 255 (1983); Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsjor Resolving 
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972); Harter, supra 
note 9; O'HARE, BACOW & SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 42. 
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Usually, citizen participation begins during the permit process, 
after site selection has been completed. To avoid this situation, some 
states have adopted the "site designation approach. "120 Using this 
approach, it is the state agency, not the developer, who initiates the 
siting process and designates preferred sites around the state for 
the construction of future facilities. The site designation approach is 
not so much a specific method of citizen participation, but rather a 
method that rearranges the timing of citizen participation. In gen-
eral, the task of finding a location for a facility is left to the developer. 
The state's role is confined to reviewing proposals to verify their 
compliance with general standards and to issue the necessary per-
mits and licenses. 
Arizona has opted for an unusual variation on the site designation 
theme by statutorily designating candidate sites. 121 In Maryland, on 
the other hand, counties, incorporated municipalities, and the City 
of Baltimore are all required to submit lists of candidate sites within 
their jurisdiction. In Maryland, if a local governing body cannot 
agree upon a specific site, then the state agency selects the site for 
inclusion in the inventory. 122 The state agency also evaluates the site 
inventory. The Maryland statute, however, does not require that 
developers choose one of the sites designated in the inventory. 123 
The Minnesota statute provides that six locations must be desig-
nated as candidate sites for commercial disposal facilities. 124 The site 
selection procedure commences when the state's Waste Management 
Board125 issues a statewide solicitation for proposals and permit 
applications from potential developers. After the Board publishes 
the proposals, all agencies concerned, the local government, and the 
local residents may file objections. 126 The Board then makes the final 
choice of the candidate site. 
120 For a general description of this approach, see Hadden, Veilette & Brandt, State Roles 
in Citing Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities: From State Preemption to Local Veto, in THE 
POLITICS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 20l (J. Lester & A. Bowman, eds. 1983); 
Canter, s'upra note 16, at 443-46; Wolf, supra note 9, at 487-88. 
121 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2802 (a) (Supp. 1985). 
122 MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-710 (a) (1) (ii) (1983). 
123 See MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3--371 (a) (2), (b). (1983). 
124 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115 A.21 (1) (1982). 
125 The Waste Management Board consists of nine permanent members which were ap-
pointed by the governor. This agency is responsible for the implementation of Minnesota's 
Hazardous Waste Management Program. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115 A.05, 115 A.06 (1982). 
126 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21 (West Supp. 1986). The regional commissions, the metro-
politan council and the local government may make the objections during a formal hearing 
process. Id. § 115A.21(2). Local residents may influence the project through participation on 
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Besides making public participation possible at an early stage in 
the site selection process, there are other advantages of the site 
designation approach. Public control over location decisions allows 
for the incorporation of social, political, economic, and technical site 
criteria which would not be relevant to a private site selection. 127 
The fact that states offer better means for site identification is also 
a tool to gain public support. 128 On the other hand, where the site 
designation model is used, states bear the costs associated with 
location decisions that otherwise would be absorbed by the private 
developer. 
B. State Government Preemption of Local Authority 
In the past, local communities could block all siting attempts 
through the exercise of their police powers. Such local tactics in-
cluded the enactment of zoning by-laws, ordinances to prohibit haz-
ardous waste facilities, and the limitation or prohibition of the trans-
portation of hazardous waste. As a consequence, most statutes 
provide for state preemption authority. 129 
1. Preemption of Land Use Power 
Local zoning by-laws and ordinances are widely used to block the 
siting of hazardous waste facilities. The inclusion of blanket override 
provisions in a state siting statute is, theoretically, a simple method 
to avoid this obstacle. 130 In Maryland, for example, the construction 
of a hazardous waste facility is exempt from any local regulation 
once the state issues a certificate of public necessity.131 In Illinois, 
the statute provides that local zoning and other land use by-laws are 
the "local project review committees." Id. § 115A.22. Moreover, a hazardous waste manage-
ment council and an interagengy technical advisory council are allowed to make further 
recommendations. Id. § 115A.12. 
127 See Hadden, Veilette & Brandt, supra note 120, at 202; Wolf, supra note 17, at 486. 
128 Wolf, supra note 17, at 486. One Minnesota demonstration project designed to identify 
suitable state sites for landfills failed due to local opposition. The project has been dissolved, 
and the project money returned to EPA. 
129 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 789-98. There are, however, some states that authorize the 
local communities to make the final decision. The California facility siting statute, for example, 
provides that no section of the statute limits the authority of a state or local agency to enforce 
or administer any provision of law that it is specifically permitted or required to enforce and 
administer. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 25147 (West 1984). 
130 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 299.521 (Callaghan 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: lE-63 (West Supp. 
1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14a-8 (Supp. 1984); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105.040 (1986); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983). 
131 MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983). 
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not applicable. 132 Other statutes follow a so-called "simultaneous 
consideration" approach.133 The Connecticut statute, for example, 
provides for the hazardous waste council to oversee the siting pro-
cess, but also permits consideration of local laws, ordinances, and 
regulations "as it shall deem appropriate. "134 Florida uses a different 
approach to override local land use power. 135 The modification of local 
zoning by-laws or ordinances may be permitted by decision of both 
the governor and the governor's cabinet. New York uses still another 
preemption process: its statute allows an override of only those land 
restrictions that were promulgated after the date of the proposed 
facility's permit application. 136 
Since federal and state lands are excluded from the jurisdiction of 
local police power authority, a state's use of its eminent domain 
authority is another alternative used to override local land use re-
strictions. 137 Usually the power of eminent domain is only used to 
obtain land for the site. Later, the land is leased or sold by the state 
to the facility operator. 138 Once the land is sold to a private person, 
however, the community can once again use its zoning power in 
order to block the siting process. 
Siting statutes that incorporate eminent domain power do so in a 
variety of ways.139 In Arizona, the director of the Department of 
Health Services may obtain lands for siting by "condemnation. "140 
In Minnesota, the state siting board may direct the Commissioner 
132 ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111.5 , § 1039 (f) (Supp. 1985). 
133 See Duffy, supra note 15, at 790; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-124 (West Supp. 1985); 
IND. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-8.6-10 (4) (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3434 (1984); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1305-A (Supp. 1984). 
134 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-124 (West Supp. 1985). Refusal of a local permit by the 
host community may therefore be appealed to the hazardous waste council. The council may 
affirm, modify or revoke the decision of the local community, and may substitute its own 
decision. 
135 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723 (6) (West Supp. 1986). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.28 
(West Supp. 1986). 
136 N. Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (f) (McKinney 1984). 
137 "Eminent domain is the power to take property for a public or semipublic use. This 
power is an inherent right of sovereignty of a municipality, a state, or a nation and may be 
conferred on non-sovereign entities by legislation." Duffy, supra note 15, at 795 n.282. 
1311 Permanent state ownership of the site is advantageous because, after closure of the 
facility, the site is still under governmental control. See Farkas, Overcoming Public Opposition 
to Establishment of New Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 451 (1980); 
Hadden, Veilette & Brandt, supra note 120, at 202. 
139 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-280 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 17 
(West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.06 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1 E-81 
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 466.155 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-14b--6 (1984). 
140 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2802 (Supp. 1985). 
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of Administration to acquire the necessary site. 141 In New Jersey, 
the state's hazardous waste commission may acquire by eminent 
domain any land "reasonably necessary" for a hazardous waste fa-
cility.142 
2. State Preemption of Local Hazardous Waste By-Laws 
Another method used by communities to block the siting process 
is to enact restrictions or prohibitions on construction. 143 Most state 
statutes therefore include a prohibition on the enaction of such local 
by-laws. 144 In Indiana, for example, no community may "prohibit or 
unduly restrict ... the treatment, storage or disposal of hazardous 
waste at a facility. "145 The Kansas statute rules out by-laws that 
prohibit the construction or modification of a hazardous waste facility 
by "ordinance, permit requirement or other requirement. "146 The 
Maryland statute exempts the proposed facility from all local re-
quirements once the certificate of public necessity has been issued. 147 
Maine has opted for a more problematic approach: it allows such by-
laws, but only to the extent that they are less stringent than the 
state standards. 148 
Some communities restrict road use, and impose weight limits on 
roads that would otherwise be used by hazardous waste transport-
ers. Several states have legislated against these techniques. 149 The 
Kansas statute disallows local ordinances that "restrict transporta-
tion to the facility."15o Pursuant to the Maryland statute, the issuance 
of a certificate of public necessity exempts from local regulation "the 
transportation of hazardous ... waste to and from the facilities on 
the site. "151 
States balance state and local interests differently. Where there 
is a strict state preemption approach, which provides for no adequate 
141 MINN. STAT. ANN. § llA.06 (West Supp. 1986). 
142 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: 1E-81 (West Supp. 1985). 
143 See Town of Warren v. The Hazardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council, 392 Mass. 
107, 466 N.E.2d 102 (1984). 
144 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Burns Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 
1985); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1107 
(McKinney 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05(D)(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1985). 
145 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Burns Supp. 1984). 
146 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (Supp. 1985). 
147 MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983). 
148 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 131O-A (Supp. 1985). 
149 IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-13 (Burns Supp. 1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3436 (1984); 
MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983); Utah Code Ann. § 26-14a-8 (1984). 
150 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3436 (1985). 
151 MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705 (1983). 
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mechanisms for citizen participation, the state may ignore local con-
cern and impose needed facilities on selected communities. At the 
other end of the spectrum, some states permit a local veto, or the 
use of unrestricted police power, both of which may easily be used 
to block all siting attempts, even when they are necessary and in 
the public interest. 
Some scholars assert that the strict preemption approach is the 
only workable solution because it is the only formal way to remove 
all police power obstacles. 152 There are, however, several drawbacks 
in this method. 153 First, state preemption does not win community 
support for a site, and indeed simply steamrolls over public opposi-
tion. State preemption presumes that local governments are not 
partners, and therefore are to be viewed as obstructionist. This 
policy frustrates citizens and intensifies their opposition. 154 
Secondly, state preemption addresses only on the symptoms of 
local opposition, not on its cause. States will never preempt all 
symptoms of local opposition; at best some of the symptoms are 
neutralized. In fact, local governments often use political influence 
power in the state government to defeat or prevent the inclusion of 
a state preemption clause in the statute. Furthermore, when public 
channels for the expression of fears and concerns are foreclosed early 
in the process, opponents may be encouraged to use extralegal means 
to express their opposition. 
Third, preemption clauses in state statutes shift to the judiciary 
the whole problem of facility siting. 155 Opponents frequently exercise 
their right to appeal permit, decisions, and even if they ultimately 
lose their lawsuit, the opponents may nonetheless be able to stop 
the whole project if the costs of delay are sufficient to frustrate the 
developer. 156 In any event, these attempts increase the costs for the 
opponents, as well as for the supporters of siting attempts. 
152 Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous Waste 
Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 1 (1981). See also DiMuzio, The Siting and 
Operation of Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities, 8 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS 508 
(1982). 
153 Morell, supra note 74; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 272; D. MORELL & C. MAGO-
RIAN, supra note 55; Wolf, supra note 17, at 491; Farkas, supra note 138; Susskind & Cassella, 
The Dangers of Preemptive Legislation: The Case of LNG Facility Siting in California, 1 
ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 9 (1980). 
154 D. MORRELL & C. MAGORIAN, supra note 55. 
155 Sussna, Remedying Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Maladies By Considering Zoning 
and Other Devices, 16 URB. LAW. 29 (1984). See also McAvoy, Hazardous Waste Management 
In Ohio: The Problem of Siting, 9 CAP. U.L. REV. 435 (1980). 
156 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 273. See Gladwin, Pattern of Environmental Conflict 
Over Industrial Facilities in the United States 1970-1978, 20 Nat. Resources J. 243 (1980). 
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Finally, the state's preemptive authority for hazardous waste sit-
ing is rarely used. In states whose statutes provide for such author-
ity, siting attempts are no more successful than in other states. 
Governors and state agencies are unwilling to overrule community's 
land use decisions. In states with strong home rule traditions, such 
as Massachusetts, experts conclude that it is not politically feasible 
to exercise a preemptive authority. 157 The only workable alternative 
seems therefore to be a balance between the two extremes of local 
veto power, and strict state preemption authority. 
III. NEGOTIATIVE SITING TECHNIQUES: THE NEW 
MASSACHUSETTS ApPROACH 
A. Hazardous Waste Facility Siting in the 1970's 
Before enactment of the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility 
Siting Act of 1980,158 a facility developer was required to fulfill both 
state and local licensing requirements. On the state level, the license 
for handling and disposing hazardous waste was the most important 
requirement. This license system,159 introduced in 1973, made Mas-
sachusetts one of the first few states to administer its own hazardous 
waste program. 160 The early regulatory approach relied primarily on 
city and town boards of health whose three members are appointed 
by the mayor, subject to confirmation by the city council or board of 
aldermen. 161 In Massachusetts towns, the board is usually elected, 162 
but the town charter or a town meeting may modify the selection 
process. 
Pursuant to this regulatory program, the board of health assigned 
a site to a developer; before such an assignation, however, a public 
157 INTERVIEW WITH JOAN GARDNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MASSACHUSETTS HAZARD-
OUS WASTE FACILITY SITE SAFETY COUNCIL (JULY 15,1985); INTERVIEW WITH LAWRENCE 
BACOW, PROFESSOR, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (JULY 5, 1985). 
158 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 (West 1981). 
159 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, §§ 56-58 (1973). 
160 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 30.00 (1984). The license was issued by the Division 
of Water Pollution Control, and was subject to such terms as the Division deemed advisable 
in accordance with the regulations. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 21 § 57 (West 1981). These 
regulations defined the term "hazardous waste," and described general requirements for 
disposal methods. 
161 Local boards of health are created by statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 26, ch. 
41 § 1 (West 1981). 
162 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 1 (West 1979). See also CONSERVATION LAW 
FOUNDATION OF NEW ENGLAND, INC., LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR BOARDS OF HEALTH 4-5 
(1982). 
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hearing was required. 163 The nature of this hearing varied from 
community to community; the procedural rules were adopted in a 
by-law or an ordinance. Usually these hearings were informal, and 
interested persons were given the opportunity to express their con-
cerns and fears about the proposed site. The decision-making criteria 
for the local board of health were that: "[t]he assignment of a place 
as a site for a facility shall be subject to such limitation with respect 
to the extent, character and the nature of operation thereof as may 
be necessary to protect public health, comfort and convenience."164 
Prior to the assignment of the site, the local board of health could 
request the advice of the Department of Environmental Quality 
Engineering (DEQE).165 In any event, the facility was not to be 
constructed or operated unless the proposed use and plans had been 
approved by the DEQE.166 The revocation, suspension or modifica-
tion of all licenses was authorized, if, after due notice and a public 
hearing, the board determined that the facility would result in a 
nuisance or danger the public health. 167 
The power of the local community - especially of the local board 
of health - has been described in detail in order to underline the 
fact that communities possessed nearly unlimited power to block 
proposed hazardous waste facilities. The community was always free 
to zone land in a manner that would exclude the facility, and the 
local board of health had the power to deny an application in order 
to protect the "comfort and convenience" of a municipality.l68 The 
former Massachusetts statute thus permitted a single community to 
block a facility that served a state-wide public interest. 
Since hazardous waste facilities bring few benefits to the local 
residents, and pose significant risks for their health and welfare, 
such local reactions were common. The statute did not include in-
centive and compensation mechanisms for the local residents that 
163 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150 A (West 1983). 
164 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150 A (West 1983). 
165 The DEQE is an administrative unit of the Office of Environmental Affairs. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, §§ 1, 7 (West 1981). 
166 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150 A (West 1983); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, 
§ 18.00 (1980); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 19.00 (1971). 
167 The board may act on its own initiative, or upon complaint by any person aggrieved by 
the site assignment, or by the initiative of the DEQE. Any person aggrieved by the board's 
action may appeal to the DEQE within 60 days of the publication of the site assignment. After 
due notice and a public hearing, the DEQE may modify or rescind the assignment. The public 
hearing is an adjudicatory hearing. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11 (West 1979). 
The application of the Administrative Procedure Act is not clear from the statutory language. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150A (West 1983). 
166 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150A (West 1981). 
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might have facilitated the acceptance of such facilities. Furthermore, 
abutting communities, who share the burden of costs of any new 
facility, were not recognized. These communities were therefore 
more likely to oppose a proposed project. 169 
In sum, Massachusetts' former hazardous waste facility siting 
scheme suffered serious shortcomings. 17o There was no public hear-
ing requirement prior to an announcement of plans for the project. 
Developers seldom mentioned feasible alternatives when announcing 
the project, so residents of the affected communities were confronted 
by an overwhelmingly complex project in whose development they 
could not participate. Furthermore, statutorily-required informa-
tion, such as the environmental impact statement, was often issued 
too late to allow for public comment. 171 
It is therefore no wonder that the former Massachusetts siting 
procedure was criticized as a process lead to conflict and mistrust. 172 
B. The New Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act: 
Policy Considerations 
The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Actl73 pro-
vides for a new approach to hazardous waste facility siting. It is 
premised on two notions: first, that a strict state overriding authority 
cannot be used effectively against the declared opposition of the local 
community; and second, that negotiated compensation paid by the 
developer to the community for the project's adverse effects serves 
as an incentive to communities to accept the project. 
Community opposition often stops or significantly delays almost 
any project, regardless of whether the state has preemptive author-
ity. Even where statutes do not provide for state override authority, 
if local police power remains unrestricted, the result may be the 
exclusion of inherently unpopular facilities. Therefore, the new Mas-
sachusetts statute provides that facilities may be constructed in any 
area zoned for industrial use. 174 Communities are prohibited from 
amending their zoning by-laws once a facility proposal has been 
announced. Furthermore, communities are not allowed to invent new 
169 M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 6-265 (1983). The authors of 
this book are the primary drafters of the new Mass. siting statute. See also SUSSKIND, THE 
SITING PUZZLE: BALANCING ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL GAINS AND LOSSES 6 (1985). 
170 Susskind, supra note 169, at 8-9. 
171 See M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 42. 
172 [d. at 25. 
173 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D (West 1981). 
174 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 9 (West 1981). 
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local permits after enactment of the new siting statute. 175 Finally, 
local boards of health are permitted to withhold a site assignment 
only where it is determined that the facility poses special risks. 176 
Limitations on local police power make possible the realization of 
the second goal of the Act. The Massachusetts legislators concluded 
that negotiated compensation paid by the developer for the adverse 
effects of the facility would be an incentive for the host community 
and abutting communities to accept a proposal. 177 The drafters 
pointed out that the 
[n]egotiation of siting agreements will reduce local opposition to 
proposed facilities . . . because communities are not simply re-
quired to say yes or no to a proposed facility. Instead, commu-
nities may respond to a proposal including both the facility and 
a package of incentives and compensation that offsets the local 
costs of the facility. This package is negotiated directly in re-
sponse to the community's concern. 178 
The theory underlying this negotiative approach is that the degree 
to which individual members of a group are active decreases as both 
the size of their group increases, and the amount at stake for each 
individual decreases. 179 If the facility is costly for the community and 
its residents, the opposition will therefore be strong. In such a case, 
the number of people concerned is small and the stakes for each 
individual are high. On the other hand, larger, more diffuse groups 
of beneficiaries are not likely to become as actively involved. 180 The 
drafters of the Act hoped that if the benefits of the project were to 
equal or even outweigh the costs, local opposition would decrease. 
If that were to happen, "the community should no longer have any 
incentive to oppose. Indeed, if the benefits to the community are 
large enough, it might actually desire the facility. "181 
To achieve such a turnaround in public reaction, the costs to the 
communities must be reduced. Any benefit that has this effect is a 
175 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 16 (West 1981). 
176 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150B (West 1983). 
177 If the community possessed unlimited police power, they could refuse to participate in 
negotiations. Preemptive measures are only relevant insofar as they are the precondition to 
meaningful negotiations. The remainder of this article focuses on the means of negotiation, 
rather than on state preemptive measures. 
178 See Bingham & Miller, supra note 2, at 478; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 275. 
179 M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION - PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965). See also M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 69. 
180 M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 69. See also Bingham & 
Miller, supra note 2, at 478-80; Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 275. 
181 Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60. 
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compensation payment, and commentators have identified five pri-
mary types of compensation. 182 Monetary payments are made when 
the developer offers payment to affected residents or communities. 
These payments can be on a lump sum or a continuing payment 
basis. The latter can take the form of a payment in gross receipt 
taxes, or a higher property tax payment. 183 Conditional compensa-
tion payments are made for costs that are feared but not certain. 
For example, a developer might guarantee the stability of property 
values, or offer insurance for possible property losses. l84 In-kind 
compensation payments are made when the developer offsets the 
costs imposed by replacing the affected resource or services. For 
example, recreation land might be offered in return for the land to 
be occupied by the facility. The major advantage of such in-kind 
compensation is that it is visibly linked with the specific effects of 
the project. Impact mitigation is the attempt by a developer to 
eliminate or reduce the project's negative effects. For example, the 
facility design might be altered or its operation modified,185 or the 
developer might provide new fire protection equipment to the mu-
nicipality.186 
In addition to the strategic effect of compensation,187 there are 
also efficiency grounds that make this approach appealing to devel-
opers. If the developer must compensate for the social costs of the 
facility, there is a strong incentive to reduce these costS. I88 A ne-
gotiated siting agreement requires early and active involvement of 
the affected parties in the decision-making process. The developer 
182 M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 71. See also McMAHON, 
supra note 100, at 5-17. See also CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE 
MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 15 (1983). 
183 McMAHON, supra note 100. 
184 Id. at 11-16. 
185 Id. at 37-42. 
186 Negotiation procedures seem to be the most appropriate method for the determination 
of the amount and the type of compensation. Some states, however, set statutory compensa-
tion, and some scholars have proposed site auctions. See e.g., O'Hare, supra note 57, at 406. 
Some states fix compensation as a function of the gross receipts or amount of wastes generated 
by the facility. Other states allow the local community to assess a special tax or licensing fee 
up to a specific amount. Some commentators assert that these statutes are designed to enable 
communities to recover direct expenses associated with the facility rather than to a compensate 
all social costs of the facility. Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 279. 
187 M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 71. 
188 The incentive approach "internalizes the external costs of the facility by requiring the 
developer to compensate for those costs, thereby bringing about a more efficient allocation of 
resources." Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 276 n.63. See also M. O'HARE, L. BACOW & 
D. SANDERSON, supra note 2, at 81-84; R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 113-16 (1978). 
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thus has a strong incentive to start negotiations as soon as possible. 
The decide-announce-defend attitude would no longer be in the de-
veloper's interest. The communities, on the other hand, would have 
a wider range of options than merely the decision to build or not to 
build the facility. The new Massachusetts approach is designed to 
ensure that interested parties remain in communication from the 
beginning to the end of the siting process. The participation of the 
community and its residents is therefore not restricted to a few 
public hearings. 
There are nevertheless certain basic issues still to be resolved if 
a siting process based on negotiation is to work effectively. First, it 
must be decided who will negotiate on behalf of the community. 
Second, an equivalency of power is necessary for effective bargain-
ing. The community must have access to sufficient technical and 
financial resources to coordinate its end of the negotiations. Third, 
there must be some incentive to bargain in good faith, as well as 
some time limit for the negotiations. Fourth, there must be some 
procedure that is invoked if there is an impasse in negotiation. 
Mediation and arbitration procedures thus become particularly im-
portant. Finally, enforcement mechanisms are required to make the 
whole enterprise workable. 
C. The Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act: 
Statutory Requirements 
Pursuant to the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting 
Act,189 a developer must obtain several licenses and permits prior to 
the construction of a facility. The operating license must be obtained 
from the State Department of Environmental Quality Engineering 
(DEQE);I90 the site assignment must be obtained from the local board 
of health;191 and siting agreement192 must be signed with the local 
assessment committee (LAC), which is a representative body of the 
189 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 21D (West 1981). 
190 Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1979, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
21C, § 7 (West 1981). 
191 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150B (West 1983). 
192 Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act of 1980, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 21D, § 12 (West 1981). While a signed siting agreement is necessary for both the construc-
tion of new facilities and the expansion of old facilities, MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 1.02 
(1985), some types of hazardous waste facilities are exempt from the statute's requirements. 
Id. The most important exemption is for on-site disposal. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, 
§ 1.02(2)(a) (1985). 
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host community. 193 The siting agreement, which describes the facility 
construction and monitoring procedures, as well as the mitigation 
and compensation efforts of the developer, is the new statutes most 
important departure from the former Massachusetts statute. 
In any Massachusetts hazardous waste facility siting proposal, 
there are three primary state agencies involved: the DEQE, the 
Department of Environmental Management (DEM), and the Haz-
ardous Waste Facility Site Safety Council (HWFSSC). The task of 
the DEQE is limited to the issuance of licenses. While the DEM is 
not involved in the license procedure, it is responsible for attracting 
developers to Massachusetts, for soliciting and evaluating construc-
tion proposals, for studying the risks and impacts of hazardous waste 
management technologies, and for disseminating all such information 
to the public. 194 As part of its obligation to inform the public, the 
DEM is required to conduct briefing sessions about the proposed 
facility.195 The DEM must also prepare an annual state environmen-
tal impact report that describes and evaluates the hazardous waste 
management situation in Massachusetts. The HWFSSC oversees 
and facilitates the negotiation process between the developer and 
the municipality. At the end of the procedure, the HWFSSC declares 
that the siting agreement is operative. 196 
The HWFSSC is a new state agency, created because existing 
agencies lacked the neutrality necessary to facilitate the negotia-
tions. The HWFSSC is composed of twenty-one members:197 eight 
state officials or their designees, seven representatives of various 
interest groups, and six representatives of the general public. 198 In 
addition, two temporary members from the host community may be 
appointed "for the purpose of participating in and voting upon mat-
ters relative to the site selection" in their communities. 199 
In order to initiate the siting process and to fulfill the statutory 
requirements, the prospective developer must file a notice of intent 
with the HWFSSC,200 and pay an application fee. 201 The notice of 
193 The term "host community," is defined as the "city or town in which a developer proposes 
to construct, maintain and operate a hazardous waste facility." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
21D, § 2 (West 1981). 
194 [d. § 3. 
195 [d. § 8. 
196 [d. § 10; MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 1.00-16.00. 
197 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.21D, § 4 (West 1981). 
198 All representatives are appointed by the governor to a four to five year term. No member 
is permitted to have a financial interest in any work of the HWFSSC. [d. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. § 7. The developer submits a notice of intent to the HWFSSC, the DEM, the DEQE, 
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intent is intended to inform the public and to provide the necessary 
information to the HWFSSC. Since these are somewhat limited 
purposes, the developer is not required to submit a detailed design 
of the facility, but instead must file only a general description of the 
proposal. The elements of the description include the identification 
of the waste to be processed on the site, the procedure and technol-
ogies to be used, the developer's prior experience with hazardous 
waste facilities, and general financial data. 202 The developer must 
also describe and explain the types of special benefits that may be 
included in a negotiated siting agreement. After a forty-five day 
public comment period, the HWFSSC determines whether the notice 
of intent is complete. 203 
Within fifteen days of its receipt of a completed notice of intent, 
and upon consultation with the DEQE, the HWFSSC determines 
whether the proposal is "feasible and deserving of state assis-
tance. "204 The purpose of this decision is to screen out proposals that 
are obviously inappropriate. 205 The "feasible and deserving" finding 
does not mean that the state has approved the construction of the 
proposed facility; only that the proposal warrants further and de-
tailed review,206 and merits the expenditure of state funds. 
The HWFSSC uses two sets of criteria in making its determina-
tion. 207 The first set relates to financial capability, technological fea-
sibility, need for the facility, past management practices of the de-
veloper, and compliance with federal or state laws and regulations. 208 
the host community, the abutting communities, and the regional planning agency of which the 
host community is a member. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 4.04 (1985). 
201 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, * 4.01 (1985). 
202 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7 (West 1981). Usually a developer must submit a 
detailed proposal as a preliminary step in the siting process. This procedure could, however, 
limit citizen participation. 
20:< The HWFSSC is required to issue a press release announcing the public comment periods 
and must publish that announcement in the Environmental Monitor, a publication of the 
DEQE. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 4.05 (1985). 
2()4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 7 (West 1981); MASS. ADMIN. Com:.: tit. 990, § 5.00 
(1985). 
2''', See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 282. 
2()1i MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 5.02 (1985). If the HWFSSC's decision is negative, the 
statute does not prevent the developer from negotiating a siting agreement with the host 
community and receiving the necessary permits. It is not likely, however, that the developer 
would succeed without a positive decision of the HWFSSC. See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 
60, at 296; M. HUNSBERGER & S. FARRELL, THE SITING BOOK: A GUIDEBOOK FOR SITING 
HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES IN MASSACHUSETTS 12 (1983). 
2()7 For a general discussion of these criteria, see the preamble of the Massachusetts Haz-
ardous Waste Facility Siting Act of 1980. 
2'" MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 5.03 (198~). 
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The second set relates to state laws governing land use in certain 
sensitive environmental areas; for example, flood plains, state parks, 
and the coastal zone. 209 
An important legal question arises as to whether there is any 
judicial review of the HWFSSC's feasible and deserving determi-
nation. 210 In Town of Warren v. Hazardous Waste Facility Site 
Safety Council,211 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the HWFSSC's feasible and deserving determination is not 
subject to judicial review. In this case, the HWFSSC had decided 
that a designated site in the town of Warren, was feasible and 
deserving of state assistance. The town of Warren argued that the 
Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act212 entitles an ag-
grieved party to judicial review of a "final decision of any agency in 
an adjudicatory proceeding." The court held that the HWFSSC's 
determination was not a final decision, but instead was a preliminary 
step in a lengthy siting process. Furthermore, an adjudicatory hear-
ing was not required because: 
[t]he only rights, duties or privileges of the town that were 
affected by the feasibility determination were related to public, 
or political or legislative functions of the town. Therefore, the 
Council's determinations, as they affected the town, were not 
made in an adjudicatory proceeding, and they are not subject to 
judicial review. 213 
The HWFSSC thus had enormous power to approve or to screen 
out siting proposals. In Massachusetts, instead of proposing a specific 
site, a developer may instead choose to participate in a site sugges-
tion process. 214 This is possible if the developer is willing to accept 
site suggestions other than the site suggested in his or her notice of 
intent.215 The site suggestion process is coordinated by the DEM, 
which accepts suggestions from state agencies, the developer, com-
209 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 5.04 (1985). See also M. HUNSBERGER & S. FARRELL, 
supra note 206, at 14. 
210 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 2, at 295-96. 
211 392 Mass. 107,466 N.E.2d (1984). 
212 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, § 14 (1979). 
2l:! Town of Warren, 392 Mass. at 117. See also Cronin, Case and Statute Comments, 70 
MASS. L. REV. at 40 (1985). 
214 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 9 (West 1981). The person making the site suggestion 
must specify how the site meets the characteristics identified in the notice of intent, and must 
secure the owner's willingness to submit the site for suggestion. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, 
§§ 7.02(3),(4) (1985). At any time during the site selection, the developer may submit a notice 
of intent for any acceptable site. [d. § 7.03. The developer therefore may choose a site that 
is technically not the best available site. 
215 [d. § 7.02(3), (4). 
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munities, and persons with financial interests in the suggested site. 
If the DEM receives no suggested sites, it may suggest a reasonable 
site. 216 
Before the final site selection is made by the HWFSSC, a forty-
five day public comment period is required for any suggested site. 217 
Within seven days after the comment period, the developer must 
identify to the HWFSSC all sites in which he or she is interested. 218 
The HWFSSC then eliminates inappropriate sites that do not meet 
the feasible and deserving criteria, are not acceptable to the devel-
oper, or that have been withdrawn from consideration by the owner. 
If more than three sites remain after this elimination process, the 
HWFSSC applies a specific set of guidelines to identify a final set of 
three sites. 219 After the final set of three sites is established, the 
developer selects a preferred site. 220 Finally, the DEM notifies all 
interested parties, as well as the general public, of the final list of 
suggested sites. 221 
1. Citizen Participation 
After the HWFSSC makes the "feasible and deserving" decision, 
the DEM conducts public briefing sessions to ensure the participation 
of interested persons and to inform the public about every pro-
posal. 222 These sessions encourage a continuous flow of information 
to the general public. The number of sessions is not limited; one 
session must be held within thirty days of the HWFSSC determi-
nation,223 and at least one of the sessions must explain the siting 
process, the community's role in the negotiation, and describe the 
proposed project.224 The content and scheduling of these briefing 
sessions is determined by the DEM after consultation with the de-
veloper and the chief executive officer of the host community.225 The 
public is invited by a notice in the local press. 226 
216 [d. § 7.02(5). 
217 [d. § 7.04(1). In the site suggestion process, there are two comment periods regarding 
the same notice of intent. 
218 [d. § 7.04. 
219 [d. § 7.04(4). 
220 [d. 
221 [d. § 7.05. 
222 [d. § 6.01. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 8 (1981). 
223 MASS ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 6.03(1). 
224 [d. § 6.02. 
225 [d. 
226 MASS ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 6.04(1). 
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Within thirty days of the filing of the notice of intent, the chief 
executive officer of the host community must form a "local assess-
ment committee" (LAC).227 The LAC is the formal mechanism 
through which the host community's interests are expressed in the 
siting process. The LAC represents the community in the negotia-
tions with the developer. These negotiations determine what mea-
sures, beyond state license requirements, will be taken to protect 
the public health and safety, and the environment. 228 The LAC is 
authorized to bind the community to the siting agreement. The LAC 
adopts its own rules and standards as may be necessary to carry out 
its functions and perform its duties. 
The LAC consists of a maximum of thirteen members, five of 
which are statutorily required: the chief executive officer of the host 
community; the chair of the local board of health; the chair of the 
local planning board; the chair of the local conservation commission; 
and the chief of the fire department. 229 The five statutory members 
select four residents of the community. The chief executive officer 
may nominate, and the city council approve, an additional group of 
not more than four members. This last group of appointees may 
include representatives of the abutting community. 230 
The LAC may apply to the state for technical assistance and 
planning grants to facilitate the negotiation process. 231 In deciding 
whether a grant shall be awarded, the HWFSSC considers whether 
the funds will be expended on projects clearly related to the siting 
process, whether the fees for the project are reasonable, and then 
determines whether the project itself is necessary. There are no 
financial limitations when additional requests are made, but the 
HWFSSC must consider whether the funds from previous grants 
were properly expended. 232 This approach allows the community to 
spend the funds in a manner best suited to its particular needs, but 
:m [d. § 8.01. If the municipality's chief executive officer fails to take appropriate action to 
establish a LAC, the HWFSSC establishes one and appoints its membership. [d. § 8.03. For 
the non-site-specific notice of intent, the LAC must be formed within thirty days of publication 
of the final list of suggested sites [d. § 8.01. 
22" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5 (West 1981). 
229 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.06 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 5 (West 
1981). 
230 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 8.02(l)(g) (1985). Abutting community is defined as "city 
or town contiguous to or touching upon any land in the host community." [d. § 3.00. 
~11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 11 (West 1981); MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 9.01-
.02 (1985). 
232 [d. § 9.05. The LAC and the chief executive officer of an abutting community may request 
reconsideration of any application that is denied. [d. § 9.09. 
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it also ensures that the expenditures are clearly related to the siting 
process.233 Technical assistance grants provided to the community 
developer enable the affected parties to analyze the project and to 
gather information necessary for effective negotiations. 234 
Pursuant to the Massachusetts statute, a developer is required to 
prepare a preliminary project impact report that examines the ef-
fects of the proposed facility.235 The report consists of two docu-
ments: an environmental impact report, and a socio-economic appen-
dix. 236 The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act237 requires 
every state agency to review environmental impact reports and to 
minimize damage to the environment. This review process is de-
signed to identify and make known to the public any potential neg-
ative impacts in the host and abutting communities. 238 
Preparation of the environmental impact report begins when the 
developer files a project notification form239 that outlines the detailed 
analysis in the environmental impact report and the socio-economic 
appendix. It also notifies state agencies and the community that the 
impact report process has begun. The developer must file the project 
notification form within ninety days of the HWFSSC's feasible and 
deserving determination. 240 
The final environmental impact report is prepared only after a 
siting agreement is established. 241 This report "shall be in accordance 
with the provisions of the siting agreement and . . . shall contain 
233 See M. HUNSBERGER & S. F ARELL, supra note 206, at 23. 
234 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 283; M. HUNSBERGER & S. FARELL, supra note 
206, at 23. 
2.% MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 10 (West 1981). 
236 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 10.02 (1985). 
237 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (1981). See also 301 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
10.00 (1979). 
238 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 10.01(6) (1985). 
239Id. § 10.01 (1). 
240 If the notice of intent is non-site specific, the project notification form must be filed 
within 120 days of notification of the final suggested site list. Id. § 10.01(2). If the project 
notification form is not filed within the time limits, and an extension has not been granted, 
the feasible and deserving decision will be rescinded. Id. § 10.01(3). There is a 20-day review 
period for public comment on the scope of the impact report. During this period, the HWFSSC 
and the State Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, which is responsible for the envi-
ronmental impact report, organize public sessions to solicit recommendations for issues to be 
addressed in the impact report. The developer then prepares a draft environmental impact 
report and a draft socio-economic appendix. Id. § 10.02(1). The draft report analyzes the 
probable impacts and the alternatives of the project within the stipulated guidelines. Public 
comment on the draft is accepted for 30 days. Within seven days of the close of the comment 
period, both agencies involved decide whether the report properly complies with the statute. 
241 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 10 (West 1981). 
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information, comments, and facility redesign data resulting from the 
negotiations. "242 The period for public comment is thirty days.243 The 
HWFSSC and the State Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
must both approve the document. 
2. The Negotiation Process 
Formal negotiations take place between the LAC and the devel-
oper.244 The negotiations are intended to result in a siting agreement 
that must be signed before the developer is permitted to construct 
the facility.245 It is worth noting here that the basic environmental 
and public health protection provided for by state and the federal 
laws are not subject to negotiation. Bargaining is only over the 
stricter, or supplementary, standards. The parties thus negotiate 
over measures that are specially tailored to alleviate the community's 
particular concerns about environmental and socio-economic im-
pacts.246 The resulting siting agreement is a nonassignable contract, 
and is enforceable in court against the parties. 247 
The Massachusetts statute lists a number of issues that must be 
addressed in any siting agreement, including: facility construction 
and maintenance procedures; facility design and operation proce-
dures; monitoring procedures; services provided by the developer to 
the community; compensation provided by the developer to the com-
munity; services and benefits provided by the state agencies to the 
community; provisions for pre-payments, accelerated tax payments, 
or payment in lieu of taxes; provisions for renegotiating, amending, 
or extending the agreement; provisions for resolving disagreements; 
and compensation to be provided to abutting communities. 248 
Before the initiation of formal negotiations, the developer and the 
community may agree to employ a mediator at their own expense. 249 
If the parties refuse a mediator, or if the HWFSSC determines that 
the negotiations are not progressing satisfactorily, then the 
242Id. 
243 Public comment on the final socio-economic appendix is limited to the issues raised during 
the review of the draft report. 
244 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 11.00 (1985). 
245 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.21D, § 12 (West 1981). 
246 M. HUNSBERGER & S. FARRELL, supra note 206, at 22. 
247 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 14.01 (1985). The developer is not bound to construct the 
facility, but if it is constructed, the construction must be in accordance with the agreement. 
248 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 12 (West 1981). 
249 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 11.02(1) (1985). 
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HWFSSC may require the parties to employ a mediator.250 In such 
a case, the mediator is selected and compensated by the HWFSSC. 
The mediator aids the parties in executing a siting agreement, and 
holds meetings at times and places convenient to both parties. The 
mediator notifies both the HWFSSC and the DEM as to the time 
and place of the meetings and of any progress in the negotiations. 
If no siting agreement is reached within sixty days of a determi-
nation that the socio-economic appendix is adequate, the parties are 
required to submit a negotiation status report to the HWFSSC and 
to the DEM.251 The report identifies unresolved issues and suggests 
whether and when negotiations are expected to be completed. At 
any time subsequent to the submission of the report, the developer 
or the LAC may notify the HWFSSC that an impasse in the nego-
tiations has been reached. The HWFSSC then determines whether 
an extension is warranted, whether an impasse actually exists, and 
when final binding arbitration will begin.252 
A single arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators is chosen jointly 
by the developer and the LAC.253 If the parties fail to reach a decision 
within thirty days after the impasse has been declared, the 
HWFSSC appoints the arbitrators. The arbitrators organize a pre-
hearing conference with the parties and may hold as many formal 
hearings as necessary within the forty-five day arbitration period. 254 
The LAC, the developer, witnesses, legal counsel, and technical 
experts for either party are entitled to attend the hearings. The 
arbitrator has the right to determine which other parties may attend 
and when a party may be excluded for disrupting the orderly process 
of the hearing. 255 
In making a decision, the arbitrators must consider the factual 
presentation of the parties; the interests of the host community, the 
abutting community, the developer, and the developer's management 
and operational history.256 After the last hearing, a draft settlement 
for review is prepared, and after consideration of comments made 
by the parties affected, a final draft of the siting agreement or of 
250 [d. § 1l.02(2) 
251 [d. § 1l.03. 
252 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 15 (West 1981). 
253 One member each is selected by the developer, one by the LAC; and the third, who acts 
as chair of the panel, is jointly selected. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 13.02 (1) (1985). 
254 [d. § 13.04(1). 
255 [d. § 13.04. 
256 [d. § 13.05. For a discussion of whether the lack of precise statutory standards governing 
the arbitrator's decision is legal, see Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 288-92. 
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compensation to be paid is submitted to the HWFSSC.257 The Ar-
bitrator's decision is subject to judicial review pursuant to the Uni-
form Arbitration Act of Commercial Disputes. 258 
Abutting communities are also directly involved in the siting pro-
cess. In addition to the involvement already described, these com-
munities may petition the HWFSSC, within sixty days of the ap-
proval of the draft impact report, to seek compensation from the 
developer for "demonstrably adverse impacts of the current pro-
posed project. "259 In filing a petition, the chief executive officer for 
the abutting community agrees to accept compensation as full set-
tlement for any claim against the developer for the project's adverse 
impacts. After approval of the siting agreement, compensation is 
established in an adjudicatory hearing held by the HWFSSC.260 
3. Licenses and Permits 
The developer of a hazardous waste facility must also obtain a 
license from the DEQE. 261 The DEQE issues a license if the facility 
"does not constitute a significant danger to the public health, public 
safety, or the environment, does not seriously threaten injury to the 
inhabitants of the area or damage to their property, and does not 
result in the creation of noisome or unwholesome odors. "262 The 
license procedure is designed to guarantee that all facilities meet the 
same management standards and technical requirements. 263 
257 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 13.06 (1985). 
258 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West Supp. 1985). The court may vacate an 
award, for example, where the arbitrator has shown evidential partiality, acted ultra vires, 
or there was a corruption, fraud or other undue influence. For a detailed discussion, see 
Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 297-301. 
259 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 14 (West Supp. 1985). See also MASS. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 990, § 12.00 (1985). 
260 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 12.03 (1985). The abutting community and the developer 
are required to meet at least once before the hearing proceeds in order to define the issues 
and explore possible compensation. [d. § 12.04. The public hearing is conducted by a presiding 
officer who produces a tentative determination of the compensation to be given by the devel-
oper. After a 45-day review period, the HWFSSC issues a final determination. Both the 
abutting community and the developer may request judicial review of the final arbitration. 
[d. § 1206. 
261 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21C § 7 (West Supp. 1985). 
262 [d. 
26.' Although DEQE's primary role in facility siting is its licensing responsibility, it holds a 
seat on the HWFSSC and is therefore involved in the facility proposal from the time the 
notice of intent is submitted. The timing of the siting schedule depends on the proposed 
facility's size and complexity. A public comment period of at least 45 days begins when DEQE 
issues a notice that a draft license has been prepared, or that a draft license has been 
tentatively denied. MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, § 30.833 (1983). DEQE holds an informal 
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On the community level, the most important step in the siting 
process is the site assignment by the local board of health. 264 The 
local board of health must assign a site if the proposed facility 
imposes no significantly greater danger to the public health or 
public safety from fire, explosion, pollution, discharge of hazard-
ous substances, or other construction or operational factors than 
the dangers that currently exist in the conduct and operation of 
other industrial and commercial enterprises in the common-
wealth not engaged in the treatment, processing or disposal of 
hazardous waste, but utilizing processes that are comparable. 265 
The new Massachusetts statute provides that, before reaching 
such a conclusion, the local board of health must hold an informal 
public hearing, and if the board refuses the site assignment, an 
appeal to the superior court is possible. 266 If the board grants the 
assignment, an appeal to the DEQE is available. 267 If the mainte-
nance and operation of a facility results in a significant danger to the 
public health, or does not comply with the site assignment, the 
DEQE may rescind, suspend or modify the original permit after due 
notice and an adjudicatory hearing. 268 
In addition, the developer must obtain all other permits required 
by the municipality. The number and the nature of these require-
ments differs from community to community.269 In order to prevent 
municipalities from creating requirements that make siting impos-
sible, the statute contains a preemption provision. The statute 
amends the Massachusetts Zoning Act270 by making a hazardous 
waste facility a permitted use on any land in any industrial zone. 
Furthermore, a community is not permitted to rezone such land 
public hearing on the draft license if one is requested. [d. § 30.837. Finally, the agency 
prepares its final license decision, and a summary response to public comments. Any person 
aggrieved by the license decision may request an adjudicatory hearing before the DEQE. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31C § 11 (West 1981). See also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 310, 
§ 1. 00 (1983). 
264 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150B (West 1983). 
265 [d. 
266 [d. For a more sophisticated discussion, see Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 297. 
267 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 150B (West 1983). 
268 [d. 
269 The developer might, for example, need a building permit, a fire permit, or, if the facility 
proposal involves the alteration of wetlands, a review by the conservation commission. See 
M. HUNSBERGER & S. FARRELL, supra note 206, at 39-42. Local communities are prohibited 
from requiring permits that had been unnecessary prior to the effective date of the statute. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 16 (West 1985). 
270 Zoning Act of 1975, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 9 (West 1981). 
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after a notice of intent is filed. 271 The facility therefore cannot be 
excluded by changing the zoning of the proposed site. 
The eminent domain power is not available to avoid land use 
permits: the developer may only petition DEM to use the eminent 
domain power if all formal license and permit requirements are 
obtained. 272 The developer must also have made an unsuccessful, but 
good faith effort, to buy or lease the property in question. Within 
forty days of receipt of the developer's petition, the DEM conducts 
a public hearing. The DEM's final decision, however, requires a 
majority vote of the governing body of the host community. If this 
approval is granted, DEM may lease the site to the developer. 273 
IV. NEGOTIATIVE SITING TECHNIQUES: OTHER STATES' 
EXPERIENCE 
A. Rhode Island 
The Rhode Island statute's negotiation procedure is similar to the 
Massachusetts approach. The Rhode Island Hazardous Waste Man-
agement Facility Act of 1982274 provides that no hazardous waste 
facility may be constructed, nor may any local permit be issued, 
unless there is a siting agreement in force between the host com-
munity and the developer.275 If the neighboring community276 shows 
that the proposed facility has a probable and significant adverse 
impact on the community, the statute requires that an impact agree-
ment be signed by the neighboring community and the developer. 277 
The Rhode Island statute provides that the siting agreement must 
specify the terms and the conditions under which a hazardous waste 
271 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 16 (West 1985). 
272 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 17 (West 1981). See also MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
990, § 15.00 (1985). 
273 [d. § 15.04. 
274 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-9.-23-19.7-15 (1985). 
275 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-19.7-5.(a)(I) (1985). The statute defines host community as 
"a city or town of the state in which a developer proposes to site, construct, substantially 
alter or operate a hazardous waste management facility." [d. § 23-19.7-3. (B) (1985). The 
Rhode Island statute provides limited preemptive authority. The siting of new facilities is 
permitted on any land zoned for industrial use. The communities are not allowed to rezone 
land once an application for a facility has been submitted. 
276 The statute defines neighboring community as "a city or town which shares a common 
border with a host community as defined herein, or which, absent a common border, lies in 
whole or in part within a one-mile radius of the lot or lots on which a developer proposes to 
site, construct, SUbstantially alter or operate a hazardous waste management facility." [d. 
§ 23-19.7-3(12) (1985). 
277 [d. § 23-19.7-5.(a)(1), 23-19.7-9 (a)-(c) (1985). 
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facility shall be sited, operated or altered. 278 The negotiated contract 
is binding and enforceable against the parties. 279 The agreement may 
include the following terms: construction, operation, closure and 
post-closure procedures; design of the facility; monitoring procedures 
necessary to assure and continuously demonstrate that the facility 
will be operated safely; compensation, services, and special benefits 
that will be provided to the host community; provisions for renego-
tiation of the agreement and for resolving any dispute over the 
interpretation of the siting agreement; provisions to assure the pub-
lic health, welfare and environment in the host community; and 
provisions for reimbursement by the developer to the host commu-
nity of reasonable costs associated with assessment, negotiation and 
arbitration of the siting agreement. 280 The impact agreement may 
address in its terms the mitigation of, or compensation for, those 
"adverse health, safety, environmental and fiscal impacts which are 
shown by the neighboring community to be likely and significant. "281 
During the siting negotiations, the host and the neighboring com-
munity are represented by the local assessment committee (LAC).282 
The LAC is assembled within forty-five days after the issuance of 
the state permit. The LAC consists of no less than five and no more 
than nine members. It is required to include the chief executive 
officer, the city or town council president, the chair of the planning 
commissions, and not less than two public members appointed by 
the community's chief elected official. One of these members is to be 
knowledgeable in environmental matters. 283 
If, ninety days after the establishment of the LAC, the developer 
or the chief elected official of the host or neighboring community 
finds that an impasse exists in the negotiations, either party may 
invoke a binding arbitration procedure284 which is limited to those 
issues remaining in dispute. An arbitration panel is established 
within thirty days after the arbitration procedure is invoked. One 
arbitrator is selected by the developer, one by the LAC, and a third 
is selected jointly. The arbitration panel must render a final and 
binding decision within forty-five days after it is established. 285 The 
278 [d. § 23-19.7-3(18), 23-19.7-6.(B)(5) (1985). 
279 [d. 
280 [d. § 23-19.7-8 (1985). 
281 [d. § 23-19.7-9. (a)(2) (1985). 
282 [d. § 23-19.7-6 (1985). 
283 [d. § 23-19.7-6(a) (1985). 
284 [d. § 23-19.7-1O(a) (1985). 
285 [d. § 23-19.7-10(a), (b)(l), (3) (1985). 
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statute mentions only general prerequisites for the arbitration 
award,286 which may be appealed to the superior court within thirty 
days of its granting. 287 
B. Wisconsin 
The Wisconsin statute288 provides for siting procedures that are 
nearly as complex as those in the Massachusetts statute. The Wis-
consin statute provides for a different approach, however, for the 
regulation of the negotiation and the arbitration process. Pursuant 
to the Wisconsin statute, the Wisconsin Waste Management Pro-
gram requires a siting agreement to be signed in addition to both 
local approvals289 and the operating license issued by the Department 
of Natural Resources. 290 If the community refuses to negotiate, the 
developer may seek state approval without a siting agreement or 
local approvals. Unlike other statutes, the Wisconsin statute applies 
to both hazardous and solid waste disposal facilities. 291 The negoti-
ation and arbitration procedure that results in the siting agreement 
is supervised by the Waste Facility Siting Board (WFSB).292 
Wisconsin negotiation procedures commence when the developer 
sends a written request to the community for a specification of all 
applicable "local approvals." In the request to the community, the 
developer includes a copy of the WFSB's standard form notice con-
cerning the negotiation and arbitration process. 293 Within fifteen 
days after a request, the municipality must provide the developer 
with a list of all required local approvals. 294 This provision prohibits 
286 [d. § 23-19.7-IO(b)(7) (1985). 
287 [d. § 23-19.7-IO(c)(1) (1985). 
288 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.43 (West Supp. 1985). For a description of the Wisconsin 
program, see Harrington, supra note 70, at 223. 
289 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.44(1)(m) (West Supp. 1985). 
290 [d. § 144.44(4)(a) (West Supp. 1985). The licensing process essentially involves three 
stages: feasiblility, plan of operation and licensure. [d. § 144.44 (2)-(4) (West Supp. 1985). 
The legislative intent of the arbitration and negotiation procedure is to set aside local govern-
ment's arbitrary or discriminatory policies that obstruct the construction of new facilities; to 
allow the expression of legitimate citizen concerns; to assure the establishment of environ-
mentally sound and economically viable facilities. [d. § 144.445(2) (West Supp. 1985). 
291 [d. § 144.445(1) (West Supp. 1985). 
292 [d. § 15.101(14), 15.105(12) (West 1986). The siting board consists of eight members: the 
secretaries of the department of industry, labor and human relations, transportation, trade 
and consumer protection and development; two town officials; and one county official. The 
town and county officials are appointed by the governor. 
293 [d. § 144.44 (1m)(b)-(bn) (West Supp. 1985). See also Wisconsin Waste Facility Siting 
Board, Admin. Rules, (1985) [hereinafter cited as WFSBj. 
294 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.44(1m)(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
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attempts by the municipalities to adopt requirements that would 
prohibit the siting of hazardous waste facilities within their bound-
aries. 295 
After the request for specification of all local approvals, the af-
fected municipalities may adopt a siting resolution and may appoint 
members to the local committee (LC).296 The resolution states that 
the municipality intends to participate in the negotiation and arbi-
tration process. The LC is the body authorized to negotiate the 
siting conditions with the developer. It may conduct public infor-
mation hearings at any time concerning the siting agreement. 297 The 
governing body in the proposed host community appoints four mem-
bers to the LC, two of whom may not be municipal employees or 
elected officials. The county of the host community appoints two 
members. The other affected municipalities appoint one member. 298 
The size of the LC therefore depends on the number of affected 
municipalities. The LC, however, receives no technical assistance 
grants from the WFSB: compensation for the expenses during the 
negotiations are part of the siting agreement. If the municipalities 
fail to adopt a siting resolution, or to appoint members to the LC, 
the developer may seek state approval without being required to 
negotiate with the municipality. 299 
The negotiations between the developer and the LC may begin at 
any time after the appointment of the LC members. The negotiation 
sessions are open to the public300 and the parties are allowed to 
negotiate on any subject except either the applicant's responsibilities 
under the license requirements, or the need for the facility. 301 
Either party may request a mediator02 at any time during the 
negotiation period; the mediators's function is to encourage a vol-
295 Id. § 144.445, (5)(0, (3)(fm). See also Nelson v. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 88 Wis. 2d 1, 
276 N.W.2d 302, aiI'd., 96 Wis. 2d 730, 292 N.W.2d 655 (1980) (legislatively overruled). 
296 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.45(6)(a) (West Supp. 1985). 
297 WFSB 6.01 (1984). A public informational hearing is defined as "a hearing where the 
local committee shall afford all interested persons or their representatives an opportunity to 
present facts, views or arguments relative to a proceeding before the board or the local 
committee." WFSB 1.04(2)(a) (1984). 
298 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(7)(a) (West Supp. 1985). Within 15 days after their appoint-
ment, the members of the LC file a statement regarding any personal economic interests that 
might be affected by construction of the facility. WFSB 4.01-4.03 (1984). The "affected 
municipality" is the host community, the host county, or the community or county within 1,200 
feet of the proposed facility. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.43 (1) (West Supp. 1985). 
299 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(0 (West Supp. 1985). 
800 Id. § 144.445(9)(a). 
301 Id. § 144.445(8)(a). 
802 Id. § 144.445(9)(c). See also WFSB 8.01 (1984). 
372 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:329 
untary settlement of the dispute. The mediator has no authority to 
impose a settlement. The mediator may hold separate meetings with 
the parties or their representatives. The meetings may be closed. 
The cost of the mediator is to be shared equally between the devel-
oper and the LC.303 
The Wisconsin statute makes it possible to petition to the WFSB 
for a determination as to whether a given set of facts establishes 
default. 304 If the LC defaults, the developer may continue to seek 
state approval of the facility without proceeding with the negotiation 
and arbitration process. If the developer defaults, construction of 
the facility is disallowed. In general, non participation in a negotiat-
ing session constitutes default. There are, however, two exceptions: 
nonparticipation for "good cause, or because further negotiations 
cannot reasonably be expected to result in a settlement. "305 In these 
cases, a public hearing must be held by the WFSB. This decision is 
subject to judicial review. 
All issues that the parties agreed upon are incorporated into a 
written agreement. 306 The agreement is submitted for approval by 
the appropriate governing body of the community. 307 If the governing 
body does not approve the agreement, the agreement is void, and 
the negotiations continue. 
In order to avoid endless negotiations, the Wisconsin statute pro-
vides for an arbitration procedure. If an agreement is not reached 
on any item "after a reasonable period of negotiation," a petition for 
the initiation of arbitration may be submitted to the WSFB jointly 
or by either party.308 If the WFSB determines that further proceed-
ings are warranted, it may request a status conference with the 
parties and a WFSB examiner. 309 
If the WFSB determines that further negotiations will not resolve 
the dispute, it agrees to hear the arbitration case. Either party may 
303 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(9)(d) (West Supp. 1985). Mediation costs are only paid if the 
arbitration award or the siting agreement specifies an amount. ld. 
304 ld. § 144.445(9)(e). See also WFSB 9.01-9.07 (1984). 
305 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (9)(e) (West Supp. 1985). 
306 I d. § 144.445(9)(g). 
3071d. § 144.445(9)(i). If the LC includes members from the local community, and this 
governing body approves the agreement, it is binding on all of the participating communities. 
On the other hand, the statute also provides that, if there is no host community in the LC, 
the approval of the governing body of all municipalities with members in the LC makes the 
agreement binding on all of the participating communities. ld. § 144.445 9(k) (West Supp. 
1985). 
308 ld. § 144.445 (lO)(a) (West Supp. 1985). See also WFSB 11.01-11.09 (1984). 
309 WFSB 11.04 (1984). 
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submit a petition for the determination of an arbitrable dispute. 310 
WFSB must then conduct a public meeting, in which the parties 
have an opportunity to explain their arguments for their final offer. 311 
The Board then issues an arbitration award. This decision requires 
the approval of at least five of the eight board members.312 The 
WFSB may only accept one of the parties' final offers, and is not 
allowed to make any modifications. If the WFSB fails to issue an 
arbitration award, the governor must issue the arbitration award. 
However it is issued, the award is binding on the developer and the 
participating communities, and does not require any approval by the 
communities. 313 
C. Connecticut 
The Connecticut Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act of 1981,314 
provides that a negotiated agreement is not a requirement for the 
receipt of a state license and local permits. In Connecticut, the owner 
or operator of a hazardous waste facility must compensate the mu-
nicipality for adverse affects. 315 The manner of such compensation is 
decided by the legislative body of the municipality; it is either an 
assessment or "negotiated incentives. "316 Regardless of the compen-
sation scheme the municipality chooses, the amount of the assess-
ment or of the negotiated incentives, is fixed by statute, and is 
determined as a percentage of the facility's projected quarterly gross 
receipt. 317 
310 WFSB 10.01 (1984). Only the following disputes are subject to arbitration: compensation 
to any person for substantial economic impact; reimbursement to the communities of the costs 
incurred during the negotiations; operational concerns such as noise, dust, etc.; traffic flows 
resulting from the facility; closing provisions; economically feasible methods of waste reduction 
and recycling at the facility; and applicability of pre-existing local approvals. WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144.445(8)(b) (West Supp. 1985). 
311 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (10)(0) (West Supp. 1985). See also WFSB 12.03 (1984). A 
public meeting is a meeting "conducted in any arbitration prodding where the parties and 
only those parties to the arbitration or their representatives shall be afforded the opportunity 
to present facts, views or arguments relative to the arbitration." WFSB 1.04(c) (1984). 
312 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (1O)(p) (West 1985); WFSB 12.06 (1984). 
313 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(10)(q) (West 1985). The scope of judicial review for the 
arbitration award is governed by the Wisconsin Arbitration Act and is limited to procedural 
issues. See id. § 227.064(5), 227.22(2) (West 1982); Id. § 788.10, 788.11 (West 1981). 
314 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-115-134 (1985). 
315 Id. § 22a-128. 
316 Id. § 22a-128(b). 
317 Id. § 22a-128(a). If the hazardous waste facility is located in more than one municipality, 
such compensation is to be made on a pro rata basis, calculated by the number of gallons or 
cubic yards of hazardous waste disposed of in each such municipality. Id. § 22a-128(b). 
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The negotiated incentive items include but are not limited to: 
payment to abutting landowners of the diminution of property val-
ues; purchase of a greenbelt buffer around the proposed facility for 
safety and aesthetics; development of open space and recreational 
facilities for the town; provision of the fire equipment that may be 
required by of the proposed facility; access routes to the hazardous 
waste facility; and direct financial payment. 318 Any agreement 
reached through such negotiations would be consistent with the 
interests and the purposes of the statute. 
A local project review committee (LPRC) negotiates as the rep-
resentative of the community.319 An LPRC may be established in 
each proposed host community, and consists of not less than four 
and not more than nine members. One of the members must be from 
the community that will be most affected by the proposed facility, 
and is to be named by the State Siting Council (SSC). The SSC is 
the governmental agency that issues the certificate of public safety 
and necessity. 320 
The negotiations begin after the municipality chooses to proceed 
with negotiated incentives rather than an assessment, and must be 
completed within sixty days. The developer and the LPRC each file 
a report with the SSC outlining the negotiable items, as well as the 
points of agreement and disagreement. After the filing of these 
reports, the SSC may meet with the developer and the LPRC to 
discuss the negotiations and the reports. The LPRC functions as the 
sole arbitrator of disputes arising from the negotiations. 
D. Comparative Analysis 
This section of the article compares negotiation-based statutes, 
and discusses the technical prerequisites for successful negotiations: 
1) incentives to negotiate; 2) party selection and the insurance of a 
balance of power among the negotiating parties; 3) a method for the 
resolution of impasses; and 4) enforcement mechanisms. 
For the community, the primary incentive for participation in the 
negotiations is the expectation of compensation. The developer, on 
the other hand, expects the facility to be profitable and is therefore 
318 [d. § 22a-128(c). 
319 [d. § 22a-127. 
320 [d. § 22a-1l7(a). The Connecticut statute provides that a facility developer must apply 
for a certificate of public safety and necessity, to be issued by the Connecticut Siting Council. 
The developer must additionally apply for all necessary state licenses and local permits. See 
id. § 22a-1l7(a), 22a-124(b). 
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willing to compensate the community to ensure its cooperation. All 
state statutes provide incentives for reaching agreements between 
the developer and the affected communities.321 
Pursuant to the Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes, the 
communities are required to negotiate and to sign a siting agreement 
prior to the construction of a new facility. If a siting agreement is 
not concluded by the parties, the dispute is resolved by an arbitra-
tor.322 Since the outcome is thus taken out of the parties' hands, 
arbitration gives them an additional incentive to reach their own 
decision. In both Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the state has 
insufficient preemptive authority to make the final decision. Preemp-
tive provisions in both statutes merely authorize hazardous waste 
facilities as permitted land uses, and prohibit rezoning after a siting 
application has been submitted. 323 These statutory provisions do not 
overrule local authority, but they may force the affected community 
to participate in the negotiation procedure. 
Pursuant to the statutes in Connecticut and Wisconsin, commu-
nities are given the option to negotiate. In Wisconsin, if the com-
munity refuses to negotiate, the developer may seek state approval 
of the facility and is not required to apply for local approval. 324 A 
siting agreement is necessary to the siting procedure only if the 
community participates in the negotiation. The Connecticut statute 
provides that the developer must pay a statutorily fixed amount of 
compensation for any new facility.325 The community may elect be-
tween the payment of an assessment of negotiated incentives prior 
to the commencement of negotiations. Both statutes contain an ar-
bitration procedure to resolve disputes. In sum, in all four states, 
developers are required to negotiate if they wish to proceed with 
the project. In Wisconsin and Connecticut, it is optional for the 
communities to negotiate, but if they do not, the state preempts 
local police power. 
All four statutes also provide for local committees through which 
the interests of the community and its residents are represented in 
the siting process. In Massachusetts and Rhode Island town officials 
are also involved in the local permit process and are statutory mem-
bers of these committees. In Massachusetts, the statutory members 
321 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-19.7-5. (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D 
§ 12 (West 1981). 
322 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D § 15 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-10 (1985). 
323 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 9 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-4 (1985). 
324 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(6)(0 (West Supp. 1985). 
325 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-128 (West Supp. 1985). 
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appoint the other members; in Rhode Island and Connecticut, the 
committee members are appointed by the community's chief elected 
official; and in Wisconsin the governing body of the host community 
elects the members for the LC. None of the states require election 
of members through a referendum. All statutes, however, require a 
representation of community residents on the local committees. In 
general citizen involvement in the siting process is limited to their 
participation in informal public hearings. 326 In Massachusetts and 
Wisconsin, negotiations between the local committee and the devel-
oper are open to the public; only in Massachusetts does the permit-
ting agency hold public briefing sessions to inform citizens about the 
progress of the siting process. 327 
In Wisconsin, Connecticut, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the 
local committees are authorized to bind the community to a siting 
agreement or to a negotiated incentive agreement. 328 The LCs re-
ceive technical assistance grants in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and 
Connecticut. 329 In all four states, the negotiations are not restricted 
to any specific issues. 33o The Wisconsin statute provides that the 
parties may negotiate any subject except either the need of the 
facility, or a proposal that renders the license requirement less strin-
gent. Both the Massachusetts and Wisconsin regulations provide for 
a mediator who facilitates the negotiations between the parties. 331 
In Wisconsin either party may requires a mediator whose expenses 
are paid by the WFSB. In Massachusetts, the parties may agree to 
use mediation, or, in specified situations, the HWFSSC may require 
the use of a mediator. 
All four statutes provide for arbitration to resolve impasses, but 
the point at which the parties may request arbitration varies. A 
326 WFSB 6.01 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-6(b)(4) (1985). 
327 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 8 (West 1981). 
328 However, the 1,200 foot limitation on what areas constitute affected communities may 
prove insufficient to include all communities potentially affected by the proposed facility. In 
Wisconsin, each affected community appoints a member. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445(7)(a) 
(West Supp. 1985). The number of members of the local committee therefore increases as the 
number of affected communities increase. In Connecticut, only the community which is likely 
to be the most affected appoints a member to the LPRC. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-
127(a) (1985). In Rhode Island, the abutting communities are entitled to negotiate a separate 
impact agreement and have their own committee if they can show that the proposed facility 
has a probable and significant adverse impact on their community. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
19.7.9 (1985). 
329 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.2lD, § 11 (West 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-7. (West 
Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127(b) (Supp. 1985). 
330 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.7-8 (West Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 2lD 
§ 12 (West 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (8) (West Supp. 1985). 
331 See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 990, § 11.02 (1985); WFSB 8.01 (1984). 
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petition for arbitration by either party is possible in Massachusetts 
sixty days after the preliminary project impact report has been 
completed; in Connecticut, sixty days after the local bodies make 
their final decisions about the local permits; in Rhode Island, ninety 
days; and in Wisconsin, 120 days after the local committee is formed. 
The Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes provide that the ar-
bitration panel resolves the dispute forty-five days after establish-
ment. In Connecticut and Wisconsin, the siting boards are the sole 
arbitrators of the dispute. This solution is consistent with the wide 
preemptive authority given to the boards. All the statutes restrict 
the arbitration award to the issues in dispute. Judicial review of the 
arbitration award is limited to a consideration of procedural rather 
than substantive issues. Arbitration awards and siting agreements 
are binding upon the developer and the host community, and are 
enforceable in any court. 
In sum, a comparison of all four statutes reveals a common pattern 
designed to ensure efficient negotiations: 1) a judicially enforcible 
siting agreement between the community and the developer; 2) local 
representative committees include community officials and citizens; 
3) involvement of abutting communities and the general public in 
the siting process; 4) technical assistance grants for the local com-
mittee; and 5) deadlines for negotiations, and subsequent arbitration 
to resolve impasses and to render a final decision. 
The basic difference among the statutes concerns the issue of 
whether the communities are obligated to negotiate. The Connecti-
cut and Wisconsin statutes delegate the final siting decision to the 
siting board if the community resists negotiation. In Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island, an independent arbitrator makes the final deci-
sion. It is worth noting that the Wisconsin statute does not provide 
for technical assistance grants. It is therefore not clear how the 
balance of power in negotiations can be secured. The Massachusetts 
statute is careful to organize an equal bargaining situation by re-
quiring the provision of unlimited grants to the local community and 
the preparation of a socio-economic appendix. 
Conclusion 
The final test of all administrative procedures is its practical im-
plementation. In Massachusetts, five developers sought to locate 
hazardous waste facilities in the state. By 1985, each attempt had 
failed. 
The early experience thus seems to support critics of the Massa-
chusetts statute who claim that the social costs of hazardous waste 
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facilities are not compensable, and that a diffusion of public opposi-
tion is therefore not possible. 332 In addition, the critics argue that 
the negotiating procedure provided for in the Massachusetts statute 
merely lengthens the siting process, whereas the use of preemptive 
authority would make the process workable and more efficient. 
Nevertheless, a final judgment about the possibility of successful 
implementation of the Massachusetts statute is premature. The ne-
gotiation approach to siting new facilities in Massachusetts is rela-
tively new, and the experience of five siting attempts is insufficient 
to prove the validity of such an administrative procedure. All the 
siting attempts were aborted before reaching the negotiation and 
mediation stage of the procedure. While the siting attempts revealed 
some of the statute's shortcomings, the legislation could be amended 
without changing the basic elements of the negotiation procedure. 
On balance, however, when compared to the former Massachusetts 
approach, or to the strict preemption approach, the use of negotia-
tion and mediation in the siting of new facilities has several advan-
tages. The availability of compensatory payments addresses the un-
derlying causes of public opposition. Communities remain 
continuously involved in the siting process, and the required agree-
ment between a developer and a community provides the opportu-
nity for more alternatives than simply the approval or disapproval 
of a particular project. Technical assistance grants provided by the 
state allow the community to develop its own position for negotiation 
with the developer. The Massachusetts statute provides further for 
the involvement of the general public and the abutting communities 
in the decision-making process, thus permitting them to influence 
the final result. 
The Massachusetts statute thus represents an innovative approach 
to the resolution of hazardous waste facility siting problems. While 
it is still too early to pass final judgment on the effectiveness of this 
new approach, it is safe to say that, at least in theory, that it marks 
a considerable improvement over other similar efforts. 
332 See Bacow & Milkey, supra note 60, at 276-278. 
